University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
From the SelectedWorks of Timothy R Tarvin

2011

Bankruptcy, Relocation and the
Debtor’s Dilemma: Preserving Your
Homestead Exemption versus
Accepting the New Job Out of State
Timothy R Tarvin, University of Arkansas

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/timothy_tarvin/2/

Bankruptcy, Relocation, and the Debtor’s Dilemma:
Preserving Your Homestead Exemption Versus
Accepting the New Job Out of State
Timothy R. Tarvin*
Current unemployment levels have forced a significant portion of
homeowners to contemplate bankruptcy. In an attempt to avoid the
impending bankruptcy, those homeowners have sought new
employment, even when that new employment would entail moving to a
different state. Yet crossing state lines may be the worst strategy for a
debtor considering bankruptcy. Most jurisdictions limit the homestead
exemption in bankruptcy to residents; to exempt a home from creditor
claims, a debtor must have lived in her current domicile for two years.
Thus, the unemployed debtor who is trying to avoid bankruptcy by
moving out of state to begin new employment sets herself up for a
tremendous disadvantage should bankruptcy become necessary in the
new state. Her move requires her to gamble her homestead protection
in bankruptcy against the likelihood that new employment will keep her
out of bankruptcy. Faced with this dilemma, the savvy debtor would do
well to file for bankruptcy protection before moving. To be sure,
bankruptcy laws create a perverse incentive for debtors to file
bankruptcy prior to relocating out of state.
Bankruptcy laws were never intended to present debtors with this
dilemma. For that matter, they were never intended to create an
incentive to file for bankruptcy. This Article challenges the assumptions
that underlie the present failing of bankruptcy law regarding homestead
exemption requirements. It then proposes statutory changes that will
eliminate this problem. Specifically, it suggests that bankruptcy statutes
must: (1) adopt a standard for exemption eligibility that coincides with
venue requirements; (2) examine the relative financial impact of the
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relocation; and (3) repeal the dollar cap on homestead exemptions in
the context of relocation. These simple changes will both promote
overall re-employment that requires interstate relocation and prevent
unnecessary bankruptcy filings.
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INTRODUCTION
In the midst of a recession in an increasingly mobile society in which
millions of people relocate annually, there is a growing tension between
a debtor’s financial self-interest in moving to a new state to pursue
employment and a debtor’s desire to avoid the risk of losing her home
because of the move.1 Current law presents that dilemma for insolvent
relocating debtors because relocation across state lines puts the debtor’s
homestead exemption at risk.2
The purpose of the homestead exemption is to protect a homeowner
from general creditors who would otherwise take her home. The
exemption prevents creditors who do not have a mortgage lien or other
lien against a homestead from seizing and selling the home to apply the
homeowner’s equity towards satisfaction of creditors’ claims. The
homestead exemption exists under the laws of most states and is
recognized under federal law, including bankruptcy law. The effect of
homestead exemption laws is to protect home equity, preserve home
ownership, avoid the eviction of families, and minimize the need for
public welfare and housing assistance. In short, homestead exemption
laws serve a legitimate state interest. It is only the apparent abuse of
these laws that has created a problem for Congress and a dilemma for
homeowners.
How did this dilemma for homeowners come to exist? The purpose
of the bankruptcy exemptions is to ensure that a debtor is able to keep
property necessary for a “fresh start.” The homestead exemption
protects part or all of a debtor’s home equity from being liquidated in
bankruptcy to pay creditors. However, “bad actors” who profited from
the corporate scandals in the early 2000s3 used bankruptcy laws to
protect their unjust enrichment by sheltering millions of dollars using
1. The drama surrounding this dilemma is heightened by the prolonged economic downturn.
March 2009 was the fourth straight month with job losses greater than 600,000. The loss of
741,000 jobs in January 2009 constitutes the biggest one-month decline since 1949. Justin Fox,
Unemployment Rise Shows Recession Far From Over, TIMESBUSINESS (Apr. 3, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1889402,00.html. The national unemployment
rate for 2009 was 9.3%. The unemployment rate for 2010 increased to 9.6% and represents
14,825,000 unemployed people seeking work. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVERAGES—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN
NON-INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION, 1940 TO DATE 194 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/
cps/cpsaat1.pdf.
2. Exempt assets are those the debtor is permitted to keep for her “fresh start” in recovering
financially. The homestead exemption protects the debtor’s home equity. See infra Parts I.C and
I.D (discussing domiciliary requirements for exemption eligibility). The origin of the phrase is
traceable to Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).
3. The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES.COM (Aug. 26, 2002, 5:30 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.
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the unlimited state homestead exemptions. For instance, a debtor living
in a state with no homestead exemption could move to a state with an
unlimited homestead exemption and purchase an expensive personal
residence in that state. By moving to the new state and becoming
eligible for the unlimited homestead exemption after a short time, the
debtor could file bankruptcy and employ the state homestead exemption
law to shield the ill-gotten corporate profits from deserving creditors.
Thus, in states with an unlimited homestead exemption, the debtor
could exploit a “mansion loophole” in bankruptcy law.
This conduct outraged creditors, the general public, and Congress.4
The mounting public outcry and ensuing political pressure led Congress
to pass the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), which, among other goals, aimed to close the
“mansion loophole” by preventing a debtor from acquiring a more
favorable homestead exemption by moving to another state on the eve
of filing bankruptcy.5 The reforms implemented by BAPCPA included
provisions substantially lengthening the time for exemption eligibility in
the new state and limiting the debtor’s ability to gain exemption
eligibility in the previous state.6 The intended result was to stop the
windfalls that resulted from bad actors exploiting unlimited homestead
exemptions across state lines.
Although BAPCPA appeared to accomplish its design of stopping the
inequitable conduct of wealthy bad actors, it also resulted in unintended
(and severely negative) effects on the general public. The typical
American debtors—living on the edge of their income and struggling to
make their monthly mortgage payments—frequently face bankruptcy
4. See Thomas Evans & Paul B. Lewis, An Empirical Economic Analysis of the 2005
Bankruptcy Reforms, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 327, 327 (2008) (asserting that one of the stated
goals of BAPCPA was to limit access to bankruptcy relief in order to find and limit abuse) (citing
151 CONG. REC. S1814 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2005) (statement of Sen. Bill Frist)). The House also
explained that
[t]he bill . . . restricts the so-called “mansion loophole.” Under current bankruptcy law,
debtors living in certain states can shield from their creditors virtually all of the equity
in their homes. In light of this, some debtors actually relocate to these states just to
take advantage of their “mansion loophole” laws. S. 256 closes this loophole for abuse
by requiring a debtor to be a domiciliary in the state for at least two years before he or
she can claim that state’s homestead exemption; the current requirement can be as little
as 91 days. The bill further reduces the opportunity for abuse by requiring a debtor to
own the homestead for at least 40 months before he or she can use state exemption law;
current law imposes no such requirement.
H.R. REP. NO. 109–31, pt. 1, at 15–16 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
5. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 1098, §§ 307–308, 119 Stat. 23, 81–82 (codified as 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), (o), (p) (2006))
(limiting homestead exemption eligibility).
6. See infra Parts I.B–C (discussing BAPCPA’s domiciliary requirements for exemption
eligibility).
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when unemployment arrives and often must consider relocation.7
Looking for a new job anywhere, debtors routinely contemplate moving
across state lines.8 Yet under BAPCPA, that move to another state will
often both strip the debtors of their former state’s homestead exemption
and deprive them of the new state’s homestead exemption.9 Although
BAPCPA purports to offer debtors a federal homestead exemption in
this situation, there are obstacles that can bar eligibility for the federal
homestead exemption, preventing debtors from ever being able to claim
it.10 Without a homestead exemption, the debtor’s home equity will be
liquidated in bankruptcy to satisfy creditor demands. Thus, BAPCPA
places the debtor’s home equity at risk when the debtor contemplates
moving across state lines to accept new employment.
The far-reaching, unintended consequences of BAPCPA call for
statutory reform. This Article argues for that reform by first examining
the validity of the assumptions underlying current law.11 It then
considers the unintended consequences and related problems that have
arisen under exemption abuse provisions.12 Furthermore, it explores
changes in the due diligence inquiry required under current law.13
Finally, it offers ideas for a statutory solution designed to better
accomplish the twin objectives of preventing abuse and ensuring
fairness to debtors and creditors alike.14

7. More People Willing to Relocate for New Jobs; Many Moving to Texas, DALLAS BUS. J.
(July 28, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2009/07/27/daily18.html. According
to employment research firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas, rising unemployment rates coincide
with relocation rates among workers who are willing to move across the United States for a new
job. In the second quarter of 2009, the firm’s data showed that an astonishing 18.2% of job
seekers secured employment by moving for their new position. The Internet is making it easier
for job seekers to find work outside the regions in which they reside, and the overwhelming
desire to get back to work appears to outweigh the perceived risks of relocation. Id.
8. A Pew study reveals, by a plurality of 44%, that job and business opportunities are the
primary reasons for a move. D’Vera Cohn & Rich Morin, Who Moves? Who Stays Put? Where’s
Home?, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1, 2 (Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/
2011/04/American-Mobility-Report-updated-12-29-08.pdf.
9. See, e.g., In re Katseanes, No. 07-40168-JDP, 2007 WL 2962637, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho
2007) (holding that the debtors were eligible to claim the Utah homestead exemption and were
not therefore “ineligible for any exemption” under the savings clause, despite the fact that the
Utah exemption applied exclusively to property located within Utah so that the debtors could not
benefit from the exemption (emphasis added)).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Parts I.C–D.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part III.
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I. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005
BAPCPA changed the bankruptcy code in many ways.15 A key
change altered the law on exemptions to curb a debtor’s ability to avoid
creditors through relocation to a jurisdiction with more favorable law.16
This change in the law was implemented by a series of new provisions.
One provision predicates the debtor’s eligibility for exemptions on
continuous domicile of two years preceding the filing.17 Another
provision imposes a dollar cap on the amount of the homestead
exemption when a relocated debtor acquires a residence18 in a new
jurisdiction three years and four months preceding the filing.19 A third
provision reduces the value of a debtor’s homestead exemption that is
attributable to the conversion of nonexempt property to exempt property
within ten years of filing whenever the debtor has the intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors.20 The changes under BAPCPA have not
gone unchallenged. The constitutional objections to its new provisions,
however, have had no success.21
Under this new statutory scheme, the debtor may claim exemptions
under the law of the place where she has been continuously domiciled
for two years prior to the filing.22 If the debtor’s domicile has not been
15. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559; 11 U.S.C. (o), (p).
17. Id. § 522(b)(3)(A). The actual statutory time period is 730 days.
18. Id. § 522(p)(2)(A). This subsection excludes the primary residence of a family farmer.
19. Id. § 522(p)(1). The statutory time period is 1215 days. The dollar cap is $146,450,
effective April 1, 2010, and is subject to adjustment pursuant to § 104 on April 1, 2013. This
provision includes a residence, cooperative, burial plot, or homestead, but excludes any interest
transferred from a previous principal residence (acquired prior to the 1215-day period) into the
debtor’s current residence, if the previous and current residences are located in the same state.
See id. § 522(p)(2)(B) (stating that a debtor using state exemptions may use her homestead
exemption without a cap if her previous and subsequent primary residences are in the same state,
notwithstanding whether she acquired the subsequent residence within the 1215-day period
preceding filing).
20. Id. § 522(o)(4).
21. See In re Urban, 361 B.R. 910 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007), aff’d 375 B.R. 882 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007) (finding that the right of states to opt out of federal exemptions under the Bankruptcy
Code does not violate the constitutional uniformity requirement); In re Varanasi, 394 B.R. 430
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (holding that the Code did not violate due process, equal protection, the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the uniformity requirement, or the Contracts Clause).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559. The only discussion of § 522(b)(3)(A)
in the House Committee Reports states:
Sec. 307. Domiciliary Requirements for Exemptions. Section 307 of the Act amends
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continuously located in a single state for the requisite two-year period
(“two-year period”), the debtor may seek to claim exemptions under the
applicable law where the debtor is domiciled during the longer portion
of the six-month period prior to the two-year period (“six-month lookback period”).23 In other words, whenever a debtor has not lived in her
current domicile for two full years continuously, she is not eligible for
exemptions in her current domicile. Instead, she must “look back” in
her domiciliary history to identify where she lived two and a half years
prior to the filing for the longest portion of the initial six months (the
“look-back state”).24 If the debtor is rendered ineligible to claim any
exemption under the law of the look-back state or her current domicile
because she does not meet the domiciliary requirements to claim
exemptions in either state, the debtor may theoretically claim the federal
bankruptcy exemptions.25 While the option of claiming the federal
exemptions exists in theory, in practice the debtor may discover this
section 522(b)(3)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code to extend the time that a debtor must be
domiciled in a state from 180 days to 730 days before he or she may claim that state’s
exemptions. If the debtor’s domicile has not been located in a single state for the 730day period, then the state where the debtor was domiciled in the 180-day period
preceding the 730-day period (or the longer portion of such 180-day period) controls.
If the effect of this provision is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption, the
debtor may elect to exempt property of the kind described in the Federal exemption
notwithstanding the state has opted out of the Federal exemption allowances.
H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 72 (2005).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). The look-back period is the 180-day period of time that spans
the 730 to 910 days preceding the filing of the bankruptcy. The look-back state is the state in
which the debtor was domiciled the longer portion of that 180-day period. Identification of the
look-back state begins the process of determining exemption eligibility. This period might as
easily be called the two-and-one-half-year look-back period; however, the focus of the inquiry is
on where the debtor lived during the longer portion of the succeeding six-month period.
24. For example, if the debtor lives in New York and files bankruptcy having resided there for
less than two years, then the debtor is not eligible to claim state exemptions under New York law
because the federal law prevents her from doing so. The debtor must look back in time to identify
her domicile for the longer portion of the time during the six-month period between two years and
two and one half years prior to the date of her bankruptcy filing. If the debtor lived in North
Carolina during the six-month period preceding the two years prior to the bankruptcy filing,
North Carolina would be identified as that state. Unfortunately, because North Carolina’s
exemptions are available only to its residents, the debtor may not be eligible for exemptions there.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a) (2011) (stating that the exemptions available to those filing
bankruptcy in North Carolina are only applicable to residents), preempted by In re Garrett, 435
B.R. 434 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010).
25. Id. “If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the
debtor ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified
under subsection (d).” 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3). This option remains even when the forum state,
the current domiciliary state, and the look-back state have opted out of the federal exemptions.
See WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION MANUAL § 4:6 at 81 (West
2010) (stating that the savings clause may be invoked despite contradictory state domiciliary
laws); see also In re Jewell, 347 B.R. 120, 123 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that debtors
were entitled to the federal exemptions pursuant to the savings clause, notwithstanding that their
current and former states were both opt-out states).
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option to be fraught with difficulties. Depending on the facts of the
case and the jurisdiction where it is filed, the debtor may not be eligible
for any homestead exemption.
Once the look-back jurisdiction is identified, there are at least four
possibilities with regard to which set of exemptions the debtor may be
eligible to claim, as discussed below.
1. State Exemptions
With regard to the first possibility, the state exemptions include the
exemptions available under state and local law authorized by the lookback state.26 Although counterintuitive, the state exemptions include
both state exemptions and certain exemptions under federal law.27 This
distinguishes them from the exemptions under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 197828 (the “Code”) at § 522(d), which are known as the
“federal” exemptions.29
Under the Code, federal bankruptcy law authorizes each state to limit
debtors who attempt to claim its exemptions to the state exemptions
only.30 States that pursue this option effectively “opt out” of the federal
exemptions. In other words, a state chooses whether or not to offer the
federal exemptions. A state also decides to whom it will offer the
federal exemptions as an alternative to its state exemptions. A majority
of the states limit resident debtors to the state exemptions, while other
states limit resident and nonresident debtors to state exemptions.31
2. Federal Exemptions
The second possibility is that the debtor may be eligible for the
federal exemptions in one of three ways. First, in states that have not
chosen to opt out of the federal exemptions, the resident debtor is free to
26. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A). The term “state exemptions” is a misnomer in that the state
exemptions include not only state law exemptions, but exemptions found in federal nonbankruptcy law and exemptions found in the Code at 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3).
27. See id. § 522(b)(3)(A)–(C) (listing exemptions under non-Code federal law and Code law
that may be included in the claim of exemptions under state law). Some common exemptions
under federal non-bankruptcy law are Foreign Service Retirement and Disability payments at 22
U.S.C. § 1104, repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-465, 94 Stat. 2159 (1980), Social Security payments at
42 U.S.C. § 407 (2006), and veterans’ benefits at 45 U.S.C. § 352(E) (2006).
28. Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
29. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
30. See Owen v. Owen, 500 U.S. 305, 306 (1991) (holding that the Bankruptcy Code allows
states to define what property is exempt from the estate that will be distributed among the
debtor’s creditors); Storer v. French (In re Storer), 58 F.3d 1125, 1128 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that states may create whatever exemptions they choose, whether more inclusive or more
restrictive than the federal exemptions scheme).
31. See BROWN ET AL., supra note 25, at app. C (listing which states’ laws limit state
exemptions to residents).
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choose either the federal exemptions or the state exemptions.32 Second,
in some states, nonresident debtors are allowed to claim the federal
exemptions even when the federal exemptions are not allowed for
resident debtors.33 Finally, the Code offers a savings clause to rescue a
debtor whenever the domiciliary requirements render the debtor
ineligible for any exemption in the look-back state.34 This can occur
when the debtor has not resided in her current domicile for the
continuous two-year period required for exemption eligibility and does
not meet the residency requirements of the look-back state for
exemption eligibility at the time of the bankruptcy filing.
3. Either State or Federal Exemptions
The third possibility is that resident debtors in states that have not
opted out of the federal exemptions may choose between exemptions
under the state law of the look-back state or the exemptions under
federal bankruptcy law.35 The Code’s only restriction is that married
couples filing jointly must choose the same set of exemptions.36
4. Neither State nor Federal Exemptions
The fourth possibility is that the debtor may be ineligible to claim any
exemptions. She may be ineligible for exemptions under the law of her
current domicile because she has not been domiciled there continuously
for the requisite two-year period, and she may be ineligible for
exemptions under the law of the look-back state because she no longer
meets the residency requirements for exemption eligibility. Finally, the
debtor may not be eligible for the federal exemptions under the savings
clause because she is theoretically eligible for an exemption in the lookback state that is impossible for her to claim.37
32. Id. Seventeen states, the District of Columbia, and each of the U.S. territories have chosen
not to opt out and thus permit debtors the choice of either state exemptions or federal exemptions.
33. Id. A majority of jurisdictions—thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands—are included in this group.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C) (2006). The hanging paragraph at the end of § 522(b)(3) states:
“If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A) is to render the debtor
ineligible for any exemption, the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under
subsection (d)” (emphasis added).
35. Id. § 522(b)(2). This option is available in a minority of jurisdictions. See supra note 32
and accompanying text (listing states that have opted out of the federal exemptions).
36. Id. § 522(b)(1).
37. This situation hangs on how the state interprets the phrase “any exemption” in the savings
clause. See infra Part III.B (discussing the savings clause); see also In re Katseanes, No. 0740168-JDP, 2007 WL 2962637, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (holding that the debtors were
eligible to claim the Utah homestead exemption and were not therefore “ineligible for any
exemption” under the savings clause, despite the fact that the Utah exemption applied exclusively
to property located within Utah so that the debtors could not benefit from the exemption
(emphasis added)).
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The situation in which the debtor is only theoretically eligible is
unusual but can occur under ordinary circumstances. In this scenario,
the debtor may qualify for one exemption in her look-back state as a
nonresident. For instance, she may be eligible to claim some particular
category of personal property. Her qualification for the exemption
renders her ineligible to utilize the savings clause regardless of whether
she owns the type of property covered by the exemption. Thus, whether
she owns the property covered by the exemption category or can benefit
from it is immaterial. The mere fact that she is theoretically eligible to
claim the exemption is sufficient to disqualify her from eligibility for
the federal exemptions under the savings clause.38
One example would be that the debtor’s look-back state may limit its
homestead exemption to residents but allow an exemption for some
personal property. Despite the fact that the debtor may neither have nor
claim the personal property, eligibility for the personal property
exemption could serve to disqualify the debtor from the use of the
federal exemptions under the savings clause.39 This occurs because
under this circumstance the debtor is not deemed “ineligible for any
exemption” whatsoever. In short, because the debtor is not ineligible
for all exemptions in the look-back state, the debtor is denied access to
the federal exemptions under the savings clause.
The same result may occur when the law of the look-back state
provides a homestead exemption insofar as the homestead property is
located within that look-back state.40 The debtor who has moved across
state lines no longer has a homestead in the look-back state, leaving her
ineligible for its homestead exemption. Nevertheless, because the lookback state technically offers the homestead exemption to that debtor,
that debtor is considered eligible for the exemption although she cannot
benefit from it. In other words, the debtor is treated as eligible for an
exemption that is impossible to claim. The result is a lost opportunity to
claim the federal homestead exemption and the other federal
exemptions available under the savings clause, due to the fact that the
debtor is not ineligible for any exemption.41 While a few states
expressly restrict the extraterritorial application of their exemptions, the
38. See In re Brooks, 393 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that debtors were
eligible for one exemption under Maryland law and were not therefore “ineligible for any
exemption” for purposes of triggering the savings clause and allowing debtors to claim the federal
exemptions (emphasis added)).
39. Id.
40. See In re Katseanes, 2007 WL 2962637, at *3 (holding that the debtors were eligible to
claim the Utah homestead exemption and were not therefore “ineligible for any exemption” under
the savings clause, despite the fact that the Utah exemption applied exclusively to property
located within Utah so that the debtors could not benefit from the exemption (emphasis added)).
41. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C).
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law in many other states is unknown.42 This serves to further cloud the
determination of exemption eligibility and shroud the process in
ambiguity.
B. Exemption Eligibility Prior to BAPCPA
A brief review of prior law is helpful in understanding the evolution
of the current law regarding eligibility for exemptions. Prior to
BAPCPA, the law applicable to the debtor’s claim of exemptions had
been in place for over a quarter century,43 and the domiciliary
requirement for exemption eligibility was relatively clear and
straightforward.44 Eligibility for exemptions was determined by
reference to the place in which the debtor was domiciled during the six
months immediately preceding filing, or, if the debtor was domiciled in
multiple states during the six-month period, the jurisdiction in which the
debtor spent the longest portion of the six-month period preceding
filing.45
This six-month period, which was the precursor to the new two-year
look-back period, coincides with the federal law regarding venue based
on domicile.46 While other possible bases for venue exist, domicile is
often a basis for venue.47 Thus, the law relating to exemptions was
normally the law of the forum.48 Simply put, if the debtor was eligible
to file in a particular jurisdiction based on domicile, the debtor was also
eligible to claim the exemptions available in that jurisdiction. This was
seen as a weakness in the law because a debtor could acquire venue and
exemption eligibility in as little as ninety-one days.49 The relatively
short timeframe needed to acquire eligibility enabled debtors to move
quickly to shelter large sums of money in states with large or unlimited
homestead exemptions.50
The statutory provisions for attacking the acquisition of a homestead
exemption or other exemption remain unchanged by BAPCPA. There
42. Texas, Utah, Kentucky, and Hawaii do not permit the extraterritorial application of the
homestead exemption. BROWN ET AL., supra note 25, at app. C. Approximately fifteen states
appear to be unknown at this time. Id.
43. See Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (amended 2006). The law prior to
BAPCPA provided that the debtor could claim “any property that is exempt under Federal law,
other than subsection (d) of this section, or State or local law that is applicable on the date of the
filing of the petition at the place in which the debtor’s domicile has been located for the 180 days
immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition or for a longer portion of such 180-day
period than in any other place.” Subsection (d) refers to the federal bankruptcy exemptions. See
also In re Stockburger, 192 B.R. 908, 910 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (holding that the domiciliary
requirement of 522(b) was unambiguous).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (amended 2006). The actual statutory
time period is listed as 180 days.
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are three lines of attack: (1) as an objection on the grounds that the
acquisition of the exemption amounted to a fraudulent transfer under §
548 and should be set aside;51 (2) as a global objection to discharge
under § 727 requesting denial of the discharge itself;52 and (3) as an
objection to the exemption under § 522 requesting denial of exempt
status to the property acquired.53
It is important to note that none of these tools for fighting and
preventing fraud and abuse have been lost. All are still in place. The
reforms implemented by BAPCPA supplement those discussed above
and were crafted to close loopholes in existing law, particularly the
“mansion loophole.”54
C. BAPCPA Domiciliary Requirements for Exemption Eligibility
There are two look-back periods created by BAPCPA that are tied to
the domiciliary requirements for exemption eligibility.55 It is important
to review these and understand how each is connected to the other.
Both of the look-back periods relate to the identification of the
domiciliary state whose law controls exemption eligibility. One look46. 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006). The relevant portion provides:
Except as provided in section 1410 of this title, a case under title 11 may be
commenced in the district court for the district—(1) in which the domicile, residence,
principal place of business in the United States, of the person or entity that is the
subject of such case have been located for the one hundred and eighty days
immediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such onehundred-and eighty-day period than the domicile, residence, or principal place of
business, in the United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such person
were located in any other district; or (2) in which there is a pending case under title 11
concerning such person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.
28 U.S.C. § 1408 (emphasis added). The § 1410 exception deals with cases ancillary to foreign
proceedings.
47. The voluntary petition requires designation of the basis for venue by category. Official
Bankruptcy Form 1, 11 U.S.C. (2011). This statistical information is gathered and stored;
however, it is not accessible through a searchable database. Personal observation and anecdotal
evidence suggests that domicile and residence are most often the bases for venue in consumer
bankruptcy cases.
48. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (2006) (venue based on domicile) with 11 U.S.C. §
522(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (amended 2006) (exemption eligibility based on domicile).
49. This is evident due to bad actors’ usage of the law. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text (discussing “bad actors” who used bankruptcy laws to protect their unjust enrichment).
50. See supra note 3 (discussing “bad actors” who used bankruptcy laws to protect their unjust
enrichment).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 522(l); FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559; 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) and (p); see also
infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (discussing BAPCPA and the mansion loophole).
55. See infra Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2.
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back period focuses on the debtor’s domiciliary history over the twoyear period prior to filing.56 The second look-back period examines the
six-month window of time that precedes the two-year period prior to the
bankruptcy filing.57 Both of these will be described in more detail
below.
1. Eligibility Based on Two Years of Continuous Domicile: The TwoYear Look-Back Period
As mentioned above, the first and simplest is the two-year look-back
period. A debtor who has lived continuously in her current domicile for
at least two years becomes eligible to claim exemptions under the law
of her domiciliary state.58 In other words, a debtor’s continuous
domicile for two years is sufficient to make the debtor eligible for
exemptions under the law of her domicile and ends the need for any
further analysis. This provision lengthened the minimum look-back
period needed to qualify for exemption eligibility in a new domicile
from ninety-one days, under prior law, to a full two years.59 The
intention was to make it more difficult for a debtor to relocate and gain
eligibility for more generous exemptions on the eve of filing.60
2. Eligibility Based on the Law of the Look-Back State: The Six-Month
Look-Back Period (Preceding the Two-Year Look-Back Period)
There is no easy way to provide a succinct name that accurately
describes the second look-back period. This look-back period is the sixmonth period preceding the two-year look-back period. Stated another
way, it is the first six months of the period beginning precisely two and
one-half years prior to the bankruptcy filing.61 For that reason, it might
as aptly be called the two and one-half year look-back period. Calling
56. See infra Part I.C.1.
57. See infra Part I.C.2.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004), amended by Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 119-8, §§ 224(a)(1)(A)(i), 307,
and 308(1), 119 Stat. 23, 61, 81 (stating the applicable “look-back” time period as the greater
portion of the 180 day time period preceding filing). But see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006),
amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A),
124 Stat. 3557, 3559 (stating that a debtor may claim the exemptions if she has been domiciled in
the location for the 730 days preceding filing).
60. 151 CONG. REC. H1993-2048 (daily ed. Apr. 14, 2005). In support of the bill, Rep.
Sensenbrenner stated that “[t]he bill closes the ‘millionaire’s mansion’ loophole in the current
bankruptcy code that permits corporate criminals to shield their multi-million dollar homesteads
from deserving creditors.” Id.
61. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559. The statutory time period is actually
the 180-day period that is between the 730-to-910-day period that is prior to the date of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy. Id.
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this period the six-month period is designed to focus attention on the
debtor’s domiciliary history within the six-month period that both
precedes the two-year look-back period and follows the point in time
two and one-half years prior to the date of the filing. The calculation of
the six-month look-back is critical to the identification of the look-back
state in the analysis to determine exemption eligibility.
Under current law, if the debtor has not lived in the forum state
continuously for the two-year period preceding the filing, debtor’s
counsel must determine the location and duration of each domiciliary
jurisdiction during the six-month look-back period.62 A review of the
debtor’s domiciliary history during the look-back period is necessary in
order to identify the look-back state,63 which is the jurisdiction in which
the debtor was domiciled during the longest portion of the look-back
period.64
For example, if the debtor was domiciled in Kansas for more than
three months during the look-back period, Kansas would be the debtor’s
look-back state.65 This is because no other state could possibly have
been the debtor’s domicile for a “longer portion” of the six-month lookback period. In short, determining where the debtor lived the longest
period of time during the six-month look-back period is the key to
identifying the look-back state.66
To some extent, the calculus of identifying the look-back state is
counterintuitive. One might think that the state designated for the
debtor’s exemption eligibility should be the debtor’s domicile of longest
duration over the entire two and one-half year period preceding the
bankruptcy filing. However, this is not the case under BAPCPA.67 By
changing the earlier example again, it becomes clear that a debtor who
has been domiciled in a number of places for relatively short periods of
time may have been domiciled for the longer portion of the look-back
period in a domicile of less than a few months’ duration.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. Technically, the calculation would require that the debtor has lived more than 90 days
of the 180-day look-back period in order that Kansas be identifiable as the look-back state. Id.
66. If the example is changed so that the debtor was domiciled in Kansas for less than three
months during the look-back period, a comparison of the duration of the debtor’s domiciliary
periods in other states becomes necessary. Supposing that, for the remainder of the six-month
period, the debtor was domiciled in Oklahoma for three months and Missouri for two weeks,
Oklahoma would be the look-back state. Thus, the syllogism used to determine the debtor’s lookback state requires identification of all previous domiciles and calculation of the length of the
debtor’s longest domiciliary stay.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
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D. Other Look-Back Periods Affecting Homestead Exemption Value
1. The Dollar Cap on a Recently Acquired Homestead: The Three-Year
and Four-Month Look-Back Period
A third look-back period imposes a limit on the value of a homestead
exemption based on the length of the debtor’s current domiciliary
period and the time the debtor has owned a home in her current
domicile. In short, BAPCPA sets a dollar cap on the amount of home
equity a debtor may claim under the homestead exemption, depending
on how long the debtor has lived in the state and owned a home.68 This
look-back period supplements the first two look-back periods discussed
above. It is designed to prevent the unscrupulous debtor from sheltering
an excessive amount of nonexempt assets under the protection of a large
homestead exemption.
The effect of the third look-back period is to cap the dollar amount of
the relocating debtor’s homestead exemption under certain
circumstances.69 The dollar cap on the homestead exemption applies to
a debtor relocating within three years and four months of filing.70 The
dollar cap on the debtor’s homestead exemption is designed to limit
how much home equity is protected for a debtor who has been
domiciled in a jurisdiction for more than two years, but for less than
three years and four months. Thus, the cap prevents the use of the full
homestead exemption otherwise allowable under the law of the domicile
state for a one-year-and-four-month period beyond what is required for
exemption eligibility.71
As a result, even when the debtor is domiciled in a state for three
years and four months, the dollar cap restricts her homestead exemption
unless she acquires and holds her homestead interest for that same
amount of time.72 In other words, if the debtor moves to a new
domicile and rents a home while she looks for a home to buy, the clock
does not begin to run on this look-back period. It is only after she has
acquired an interest in her homestead through purchase that the lookback period begins to run. In sum, the relocating debtor must purchase
and occupy her homestead in her new domicile for the three-year and
four-month look-back period.
There are two exceptions to imposition of the dollar cap under this

68. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1).
69. Id.
70. Id. The amount of the dollar cap is $146,450. The statutory time period is 1215 days, or
approximately three years and four months. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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provision. The first is for the principal residence of a family farmer.73
The second exception is when the debtor’s home equity in her current
domicile was transferred from a previous principal residence (acquired
within the three-year and four-month period) within the same state.74
2. The Homestead Exemption Dollar Cap on Felons and Other Bad
Actors: The Five-Year Look-Back Period for Felony Convictions and
Other Wrongdoing
Congress adopted a fourth look-back provision unrelated to a
debtor’s domiciliary history. Through this provision, Congress sought
to limit the dollar amount of the homestead exemption that convicted
felons or other bad actors may claim.75 The law imposes a look-back
period of five years preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition.76
This five-year look-back period, unlike the two-year look-back
period examined above, does not consider the debtor’s domiciliary
history.77 In contrast to the six-month look-back period preceding the
two-year look-back period, the five-year look-back period plays no role
in the identification of the debtor’s look-back state for purposes of
determining exemption eligibility. It differs from the three-year and
four-month look-back period discussed above in that it does not focus
on when the debtor acquired her homestead.78 The sole purpose of this
look-back period is to prevent convicted felons and other bad actors
from sheltering an excessive amount of nonexempt property in a
homestead exemption.79
If the debtor has been convicted of a felony, as defined by the Federal
Criminal Code,80 and circumstances demonstrate that the bankruptcy
filing is an abuse of the Code, the court may limit the debtor’s
homestead exemption.81 The court looks at a number of factors

73. Id. § 522(p)(1)(B). The Code definition of “family farmer” is at § 101(18).
74. Id. § 522(p)(2)(B).
75. Id. § 522(q)(1). This section authorizes the court to limit the homestead exemption, not
only for felony convictions that are considered abuse, but also based on a debt the debtor owes
arising from violations of federal securities law, fraud, and deceit in fiduciary capacity, “any civil
remedy under section 1964 of title 18; or any criminal act, intentional tort, or willful or reckless
misconduct that caused serious physical injury or death to another individual in the preceding 5
years.” Id.
76. Id. § 522(q)(1).
77. See supra Part I.C.1.
78. See supra Part I.D.1.
79. 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1)(A).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3156 (2006).
81. See In re Jacobs, 342 B.R. 114, 114–15 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that the dollar
cap applies when a felon elects to use the state exemptions). This dollar cap of $146,450 for a
felon with a conviction within five years of filing is identical to the dollar cap for a debtor who
has not owned her home in the state of her current domicile for three years and four months. See
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enumerated in this provision to determine whether the dollar cap should
apply.82
3. Reduction of the Homestead Exemption Due to Avoidance of
Creditors: The Ten-Year Look-Back Period to Identify Conversion of
Non-Exempt Property
A fifth look-back provision attempts to close the mansion loophole in
a different way.83 Congress utilized yet another look-back period in an
effort to stop an unscrupulous debtor from sheltering assets in a large
mansion. This look-back period examines whether the debtor hindered,
delayed, or defrauded creditors by converting nonexempt assets to
exempt assets within ten years of filing.84 In other words, the question
is whether the debtor transferred assets that were nonexempt in a way
that changed the form of the asset in order to make it exempt. For
example, a debtor in a state with a generous homestead exemption
might choose to take a large sum of cash that could not be claimed as
exempt and pay down her mortgage.85 In so doing, she would increase
the amount of her home equity that is exempt under the homestead
exemption. This type of exemption gaming does not require relocation.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH BAPCPA
A. The Debtor’s Dilemma
The pre-filing selection of exemptions requires knowledge of the law
that governs the choice of exemptions. The debtor must know which
property can be protected from creditors and retained for her fresh start.
Each debtor wants to know the risks attendant to claims of exemption in
making the ultimate decision regarding filing. The Code requires that
the debtor declare the property she intends to exempt from creditors’

supra note 70.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1) (2006) (describing the factors the court considers); see also,
e.g., In re McNabb, 326 B.R. 785, 790–91 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005) (stating that the statutory
language that the limits “may be applicable” implied that not all such bad actors are limited to this
exemption, but that further reasoning is required).
83. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing federal statutory limitations to state
homestead exemptions).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o).
85. See, e.g., In re Addison, 540 F.3d 805, 814 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding insufficient evidence
to support a finding of fraud when the debtor merely paid a large sum of money on her mortgage
prior to filing for bankruptcy when there was not adequate evidence that it was done with the
intent to defraud her creditors).
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claims.86 Citations of legal authority must be provided for each item by
category.87
The importance of knowing the law that governs the selection of
exemptions is heightened for other reasons. Because the bankruptcy
rules of procedure do not permit a voluntary nonsuit without a court
order, unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the debtor cannot
dismiss voluntarily.88 This means that the debtor may become trapped
in the bankruptcy proceeding after discovering that the protection
offered under exemption law is not as the debtor expected.
While each type of exemption may be important, the homestead
exemption is of critical importance because it protects a homeowner’s
equity from general creditors. Except when a homeowner grants a
mortgage or other consensual lien to a creditor, no lien can be placed on
the homeowner’s home equity because it is protected by the homestead
exemption.89 When the homeowner is deprived of her homestead
exemption, she is exposed to the possible loss of her home equity and
her home.
1. A Tale of Two Debtors
The plight of honest Americans who are the unintended victims of a
well-intended plan to stop exemption abuse by closing the mansion
loophole is best illustrated by comparing two debtors. These two
debtors are similar in every way except that one debtor relocates within
the same state, while the other debtor relocates to a new state with an
unlimited homestead exemption law identical to her former domiciliary
state. Each debtor owns a home with a value at the national median.90
While one debtor retains all of her homestead equity, the other debtor
may lose all of her homestead equity and her home.
86. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(16)(A)(i), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
87. See Official Form 6C, Schedule C—Property Claimed as Exempt, prescribed by the
Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Official_2010/B_006C_04
10.pdf (including a column for the debtor to “SPECIFY LAW PROVIDING EACH
EXEMPTION”).
88. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7041.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
90. The current median home value in the United States is $173,200. The median sale price
for single-family homes in the Northeast United States is $256,300, compared to the Midwest at
$130,600, the South at $148,200, and the West at $210,200. Median Sales Price of Existing
Single-Family Homes for Metropolitan Areas, NAT’L ASS’N REALTORS, http://www.realtor.org/
wps/wcm/connect/497de980426de7ccb96eff03cc9fa30a/REL10Q1T_rev.pdf?MOD=AJPERES
&CACHEID=497de980426de7ccb96eff03cc9fa30a (last visited Feb. 26, 2011) (listing data
gathered from 2007 to 2010). “Property values across the nation vary widely. The median resale
price of a home in California is $215,000. In Nebraska it’s $70,200.” 151 CONG. REC. H2071
(daily ed. Apr. 4, 2005) (statement of Rep. Green of Texas speaking in opposition to BAPCPA).
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Debra Debtor (“Debtor”) is a single parent who has fallen on hard
times. She is raising two children and struggled to buy a home in a
good school district. Her mortgage was recently paid off, and the house
is her principal asset. Because her retirement funds were decimated in
the recession, a reverse home mortgage may be her only hope for
retirement. Recently, she was laid off from her job.91 Like most
unemployed Americans, she lives on the edge of her income without
much savings, using credit cards to stay afloat until she finds work.92
Because Debtor’s medical insurance was through her former
employer, she no longer has coverage for herself and her children. For
the moment, her home is her only hedge against catastrophic illness.
After several months, Debtor is offered a job in a different state (“New
State”). The move will require that she sell her home, but she is eager
to go because she will have an opportunity to regain her financial
security and have medical insurance for her family. Debtor meets with
her attorney to discuss the possible sale of her home in anticipation of
her move to New State.93 She wants to know whether there are any
legal ramifications related to the move.94
91. Nearly nine out of ten families cite three reasons for their bankruptcies: job loss, family
breakup, or medical problems. See ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO
INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81 (2003)
(quoting from the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project); see also, e.g., Chad Day, Recession Piles
on Single Moms: 49.5% are in State’s Poverty Ranks, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Oct. 1, 2010,
at 1 (“More than 61 percent of single mothers with only ‘related’ children under 5 in the
household were living in poverty in 2009, an increase of more than 4.5 percentage points from the
year before and more than 15 percentage points higher than the same category of single mother
households nationwide, according to the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey. . . .
In addition, nearly half (49.5%) of the 96,000 Arkansas families headed by a woman without a
husband and with ‘related’ children under 18 were living in poverty, the figures show.”).
92. E.g., Edmund L. Andrews, My Personal Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2009, at
MM46.
93. Unfortunately, the more likely scenario is that Debtor will neither meet with an attorney
nor learn the law until after she has moved and is considering bankruptcy. At that point, she will
discover that the move has put her home at risk because she is not eligible for a homestead
exemption under the law of Old State, New State, or federal bankruptcy law. The reason for this
is revealed in the proceeding discussion. See infra Parts II.B–D.
94. The determination of a debtor’s domicile has been the subject of litigation in a number of
cases. See In re Morad, 323 B.R. 818, 826 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2005) (holding that the debtor’s selfserving statements may not be controlling on the issue of intent); In re Owings, 140 F. 739, 740
(E.D.N.C. 1905) (stating that two things must exist or have existed in combination to establish a
domicile: the fact of residence and the intention of remaining); In re Marisco, 278 B.R. 1, 6
(Bankr. D. N.H. 2002), subsequent determination, No. 01-12120-JMD, 2002 WL 31572686
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2002) (holding the state homestead law required the debtor to establish physical
occupation for a “significant” time); In re Sparfyen, 265 B.R. 506, 518–19 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2001) (holding that when the debtor has a residence and domicile in different states, the court
must determine the domiciliary state if the claimed exemptions are challenged); In re Koons, 225
B.R. 121, 123 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998) (holding that the burden of proving that the debtor intended
to change domicile falls on the party alleging the change); In re Lordy, 214 B.R. 650 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1997) (holding that the debtor’s domicile is established by her physical presence in a place
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Debtor learns that because she is insolvent, her relocation to New
State for the job is problematic and could put much of her home equity
at risk. If she is unable to satisfy creditors’ claims and is forced95 to file
bankruptcy during the next two years in New State, she will not be able
to claim New State’s homestead exemption because she will not have
been domiciled there long enough.96 Nor will she be able to claim the
homestead exemption in her former domicile (“Old State”) because
eligibility for Old State’s exemptions is limited to residents, and she
will abandon her residency by moving from Old State to New State.97
Without a homestead exemption, Debtor’s home equity will be
liquidated in the bankruptcy in order to pay her creditors.
Debtor is astonished to find that in attempting to move to better
herself, hang onto her home, pay her bills, and support her children, she
may have to choose between the proffered employment and protecting
her home. In theory, there is a federal homestead exemption available
to a debtor in this situation.98 In practice, however, there are obstacles
that can prevent debtors from using the federal exemptions, leaving
Debtor with no homestead exemption under state or federal law.99
Thus, by moving, she risks having no homestead exemption at all.
with an intent to remain there); see also In re Tanzi, 287 B.R. 557, 559 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
2002), aff’d, 297 B.R. 607 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the debtors’ homestead exemption
rights were determined, not by the law of the state in which this new home was located, but in
which they were domiciled for the longer portion of 180 days immediately preceding their
petition date).
95. Debtor may be forced into bankruptcy in at least two ways. One is through an action by
her creditors through what is called involuntary bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006),
amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(9), 124
Stat. 3557, 3558. The other, and more likely, way is through creditor action, such as seizure or
threat of seizure of her assets and wages, which leaves Debtor with the only practical choice of
filing a “voluntary” bankruptcy.
96. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559. The amount of the loss of the
homestead exemption is likely to be most pronounced when the debtor moves from jurisdictions
with either a large or unlimited homestead exemption. Unlimited homestead exemptions are
available to residents of Florida, Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Guam, Iowa, Kansas,
Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Texas. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-210
(West 2011); D.C. CODE §15-501 (2011); 21 GUAM CODE ANN. § 43101 (West 2010); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 561.20, 561.16 (West 2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2301 (West 2005); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 31, § 1, 2 (2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-31-1 (2011); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §
41.001 (West 2001).
97. Domicile rather than venue determines exemption eligibility. E.g., In re Giffune, 343 B.R.
883, 895 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006). But cf. In re Holland, 363 B.R. 825, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007)
(stating that “applicable nonbankruptcy law does not mean exemption law of the debtor’s
domicile”). A majority of jurisdictions require residency as a prerequisite for exemption
eligibility. BROWN ET AL., supra note 25, § 4:6, at 90–102.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(C), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
99. See In re Katseanes, No. 07-40168-JDP, 2007 WL 2962637, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007)
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2. Calculating the Cost
From the above illustration, it is clear that by leaving the state
without first filing for bankruptcy, Debtor could be choosing the
proffered employment while risking her home. Because the estimated
value of her home is at the national median of $173,200 and the federal
homestead exemption available under the savings clause is $21,625,100
filing bankruptcy in New State within two years of the move could
cause Debtor to lose $151,575 in home equity and likely result in the
loss of her home.101
There is yet another possibility that is potentially even worse for
Debtor. If she is not deemed “ineligible for any”102 exemption because,
as a nonresident, she remains eligible for even one exemption category,
whether she owns property of that type or not, then Debtor could lose
her homestead exemption entirely.103 Thus, she would forfeit all of her
home equity of $173,200. In other words, mere eligibility for one type
of exemption, however small in value, may serve to disqualify Debtor
from her homestead exemption and cause the loss of her home equity.
Contrast this result with a decision by Debtor to seek bankruptcy in
Old State prior to relocating to accept the job in New State. Assuming
the homestead exemption of her current domicile is sufficient to protect
all of her home equity, filing in Old State before she moves could allow
her to keep her home and preserve her home equity.104
Debtor learns that if she lands in bankruptcy court in New State
within two years, she would have to pay the bankruptcy trustee enough
to “buy back” her home equity to avoid losing her home.105 This means
(holding that the debtors were eligible to claim the Utah homestead exemption and were not
therefore “ineligible for any exemption” under the savings clause, despite the fact that the Utah
exemption applied exclusively to property located within Utah so that the debtors could not
benefit from the exemption (emphasis added)).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559; 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).
101. The loss of this much of the homestead exemption will normally cause the loss of the
home because unless the debtor has the cash or the credit to “buy back” the non-exempt equity
from the estate, the trustee will liquidate the home as part of the estate and distribute the proceeds
to creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(13), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
102. Using the word “any” in the sense of any category of exemption, not merely the
homestead exemption. See supra Part I.A.
103. In re Brooks, 393 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re Katseanes, 2007 WL
2962637, at *3.
104. See infra Part II.A.3.
105. The trustee has a duty to liquidate all non-exempt property for distribution to creditors,
and thus, the trustee normally offers the debtor a chance to “buy back” the property prior to
offering it to others. See, e.g., Clark v. Flippin, No. 05-3066, 2006 WL 2850046, at *4 (W.D.
Ark. 2006) (discussing a trustee’s unsuccessful motion to order a debtor to buy back the nonexempt portion of her home equity).
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she would have to pay the full amount of her equity ($151,575) to the
bankruptcy trustee, who is obligated to sell the home for as much as
possible to pay Debtor’s creditors.106 For the first time she realizes the
harsh reality: accepting the job and moving means risking her home.
3. Mulling Over the Move
Debtor considers whether moving to a different state other than New
State would change her plight. She learns that any move out of Old
State could result in the same loss of all or part of her homestead
exemption under these circumstances. This is because the law does not
merely work a hardship on a debtor relocating between states that have
an unlimited homestead exemption. The law also affects a debtor who
is moving to a state with a limited state homestead exemption.
In short, if Debtor is unable to domicile for at least two years in any
new jurisdiction before filing bankruptcy, she will be ineligible for the
state exemptions in either the new jurisdiction or Old State. Debtor
may or may not be eligible for the federal homestead exemption
depending upon a number of factors. What can be said with certainty is
that Debtor will lose most, if not all, of her home equity. This is
because even if she is allowed to claim the federal homestead
exemption, the dollar cap on the amount of her exemption will be far
less than her home equity, which is at the national median home
value.107 The net result is that Debtor would put her home equity and
her home at risk by moving to accept the new job.
Compare Debtor with Evelyn Equity (“Equity”), another insolvent
debtor. In almost every respect she is like Debtor. However, unlike
Debtor, she relocates within Old State. Should she file bankruptcy,
Equity would suffer no loss of any portion of her homestead exemption
due to the relocation. Her home equity is preserved for the purchase of
a new home, retirement, or catastrophic medical expenses. The only
significant difference between Debtor and Equity is that Debtor, while
perhaps moving a much shorter distance than Equity, crosses a state line
while Equity, though perhaps traveling hundreds of miles across the
state, stays within the state’s borders. Without adequate legal counsel,
106. The panel trustee is paid a commission on assets passing through the estate in addition to
the flat fee. 11 U.S.C. § 326.
107. A minority of states has either no homestead exemption or a homestead exemption with a
dollar cap less than the federal homestead exemption. The homestead exemption in most states is
greater than the federal exemption but less than the national median home value. States with a
homestead exemption limited by a dollar cap of $150,000 or more include Arizona,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, and Rhode Island. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1101
(2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 188, § 1 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 510.02 (West 2007); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 70-32-101 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. § 115.010 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-26-4.1
(2010); see supra note 90 (discussing median home prices by region).
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there may be nothing to reveal to either Debtor or Equity that moving to
a new state to accept employment could potentially place her homestead
exemption in jeopardy.
Although neither Debtor nor Equity was trying to game the system, in
the above example Debtor loses most, if not all, of her homestead
exemption that would otherwise be allowed under the laws of Old
State.108 In contrast, Equity is permitted to retain her homestead
exemption in Old State. This limitation on Debtor’s homestead
exemption creates a windfall for her creditors, who otherwise have no
means of reaching her homestead equity. The fact that creditors
benefited from Debtor’s relocation through the additional income she
received and the assets she acquired will be immaterial under current
law. The fact that Debtor gained no improvement in her exemption
eligibility status will be irrelevant. Likewise, it will not matter that
Debtor had no intention of hindering, delaying, or defrauding her
creditors in any way. In short, nothing matters except that she moved to
New State less than two years prior to seeking bankruptcy relief.
Suppose Debtor braves the move to New State, risks her home,
accepts the job in an attempt to avoid bankruptcy, and is thereafter
forced into bankruptcy by creditors within two years.109 Could Debtor
argue that her move was not intended to avoid creditors’ claims, but to
pay them? Unfortunately not, because there is no requirement in the
Code that Debtor’s creditors or the bankruptcy trustee offer even a
scintilla of proof that she relocated with the intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud her creditors. Rather, it is sufficient to merely prove that
Debtor moved to New State within two years of filing.110 This formula,
while ostensibly preventing abuse of bankruptcy, has the potential to
punish Debtor and reward her creditors based solely on her relocation to
another state.
As we have seen, the loss of the value of the homestead exemption
may cause the loss of Debtor’s existing home because she is unable to
“buy back” the home equity she has lost. By definition, being bankrupt,
she is unlikely to have the necessary cash. In addition, the damage her
insolvency has done to her credit rating makes it unlikely she will be
able to borrow a sufficient amount. If she cannot do so, her home is

108. This outcome also results when there are intermediary states in which the debtor was
domiciled, each of which would allow the requisite homestead exemption needed for the
protection of the debtor’s homestead. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), amended by Bankruptcy Technical
Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
109. The phrase “forced into bankruptcy” is used here to mean either through involuntary
bankruptcy or through creditor action that makes seeking relief unavoidable.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A).
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sold by the trustee, like any other nonexempt asset, and applied towards
the payment of creditors.111
If Debtor does in fact lose her home, the law provides that she receive
the dollar value of her home equity that is protected by any applicable
homestead exemption.112 That means that she will be given whatever
amount remains after it is sold in the bankruptcy proceeding. If there is
any mortgage debt, it must first be paid before Debtor receives the
amount of her home equity protected under the homestead exemption.
In theory, she may use the proceeds to attempt to purchase a new
home. Unfortunately, as a practical matter, the loss of home equity
caused by the dollar cap may preclude the purchase of another home
because she no longer has cash or credit sufficient to successfully
reenter the housing market.
Given the dismal housing market and the government’s efforts to
stem the tide of foreclosures, current law is counterproductive at best.113
On one hand, the law creates a financial incentive for Debtor to decline
the job offer she desperately needs to pay her bills in order to avoid
placing her home equity at risk. On the other hand, the law encourages
her to file bankruptcy prior to relocating to be assured that she can avoid
the loss of her homestead exemption. Either choice is detrimental to her
creditors and to her. Neither choice serves the interest of preventing
bankruptcy abuse or protecting debtors to give them a fresh start in life.

111. 11 U.S.C. § 363, amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-327, § 2(a)(13), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
112. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
113. Foreclosure sales accounted for 26% (831,574 properties) of all U.S. sales of residential
property in 2010—slightly less than the 2009 figures, but still higher than in 2008. There are
currently two million bank-owned houses and eleven million underwater mortgages in the United
States. Paul Ausick, US Foreclosure Sales Lower in 2010, But Still High, 24/7 WALL ST. J. (Feb.
24, 2011, 9:29 AM), http://247wallst.com/2011/02/24/us-foreclosure-sales-lower-in-2010-butstill-high/.
The government has answered the rise in foreclosures with a number of federal and state
programs to help homeowners stay in their homes. The Home Affordable Refinancing Program
(“HARP”), the Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”), the Second Lien
Modification Program (“2MP”), and the Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (“HAFA”)
programs are part of the Obama Administration’s strategy to help homeowners avoid foreclosure.
These programs provide eligible homeowners with lower payments or interest rates through
refinancing, temporarily reducing, or suspending mortgage payments for the unemployed, offer
second lien modification, and if home ownership has simply become unaffordable, provide
relocation assistance. MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE.GOV, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.
gov (last visited July 11, 2011). The HOPE for Homeowners (“H4H”) program was created by
Congress to help those at risk of default and foreclosure the opportunity to refinance into more
affordable, sustainable loans. HOPE for Homeowners, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/h4h/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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4. Difficult Decisions: The Catch-22 of the Homestead Exemption
Dollar Cap
Even if Debtor moves to New State and resides there for over two
years without filing bankruptcy, she may encounter a problem in
preserving her homestead exemption. If Debtor does not acquire her
interest in the New State homestead three years and four months prior to
filing bankruptcy, the federal dollar cap is imposed on her homestead
exemption regardless of the law of New State.114 As explained above,
the dollar cap serves to divest Debtor of any portion of her homestead
exemption in excess of the cap and make the funds available for
creditors.115
In our earlier scenario, the home value was at the national median of
$173,200. Because the federal dollar cap is $146,450, Debtor would
lose $26,750 of her homestead exemption due to the dollar cap. The
resulting loss of protection for her home equity likely would force the
loss of her home. This forced loss of her home equity could occur
without proof of any detriment to creditors and without proof of any
intent by Debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.116
It would seem there must be some exception to a rule that appears so
harsh. In fact, there are two narrow exceptions to the dollar cap.117
Both exceptions are tailored so that neither affords any help to Debtor.
Under one exception, Debtor may find relief if her home is considered
her primary residence and she is a family farmer.118 The other

114. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1). This provision preempts the dollar amount of the homestead
exemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. The amount of the
dollar cap is $146,450 effective April 1, 2010, and is subject to adjustment pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 104 on April 1, 2013.
115. Because a portion of the homestead exemption is lost, Debtor must either buy back her
equity in the home that is unprotected due to loss of the exemption, or she must face loss of the
home through liquidation by the trustee. By definition, Debtor is insolvent, making a refinance of
the home a difficult option despite the fact that there is substantial equity remaining. If Debtor is
currently unemployed, her creditworthiness is almost nil. E.g., Paul Davidson, Being Jobless for
6 Months or More ‘Grinds on You,’ USA TODAY, Oct. 8, 2009, at 1B.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1). To say that the loss of home equity caused by the dollar cap
would cause loss of Debtor’s home is not hyperbole when one considers how difficult it would be
for an insolvent debtor to raise such a large sum of money at a time when her credit score and
financial situation are remarkably dismal. Consider also that the bankruptcy that follows
relocation may be the result of a layoff resulting in prolonged unemployment. Finally, most
conventional home loans require more than the home equity Debtor would have remaining after
loss of the home equity that exceeds the dollar cap on her homestead exemption.
117. Even if Debtor is not subject to the dollar cap at § 522(p), she will not be able to avoid an
identical dollar cap if she is a felon and her criminal offense falls with the parameters of 11
U.S.C. § 522(q). The only exception to the dollar cap for a felon is to the extent the interest in the
homestead property is “reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of
the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(2).
118. Id. § 522(p)(2)(A).
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exception allows Debtor to keep her home if she acquired her interest in
the home as a result of a transfer from an interest in another home119
located in New State, provided that the previous home was itself
acquired more than three years and four months120 prior to the
bankruptcy filing.121
Without the ability to bring herself within one of these two
exceptions, Debtor is left with a difficult choice: she may file
bankruptcy preemptively and preserve her homestead exemption in an
effort to avoid risking the loss of her homestead exemption, or she may
attempt to avoid bankruptcy, move to accept the new job, and put her
homestead exemption and her home at risk. She is presented with a
legal dilemma and a moral dilemma. She would like to move and take
the job to get her finances in order, but to do so, she must gamble her
most valuable asset and take a chance on losing everything. Should she
be laid off again, have her hours reduced, or fail for any other reason to
satisfy her creditors’ claims, she would put herself and her children at
serious financial risk, even after residing in New State for more than
three years.122
There are many factors for Debtor to consider. It may be possible for
her to move and protect her home equity without filing bankruptcy.
This could occur if New State offers its residents an unlimited
homestead exemption, or a homestead exemption that is sufficient to
protect her home equity. By moving and establishing domicile in New
State, she becomes eligible for the homestead exemption and brings
herself within its protection.123 On the surface, this seems to be the
perfect plan. Protected by the New State homestead exemption, she
waits out the three years and four months until all her home equity

119. The previous home and the current home each must be the debtor’s principal residence.
Id.
120. The actual period is 1215 days, which equates roughly to three years and four months.
Id.
121. Id. § 522(p)(2)(B).
122. The higher the dollar cap on a given homestead exemption, the less negative impact the
cap has on the preservation of home equity. The lower home equity values are, the less impact
the cap is likely to have. During the housing boom from the late 1990s through the first half of
the 2000s, the average ratio of homeowner equity to the value of the home was about 60%.
Homeowners who had no mortgage debt had 100% equity. Others had much smaller equity
shares in their homes based on the mortgage debt and the home value at any given time. The
decline in home values caused by the collapse of the housing market pushed homeowners’
average equity to about 38%. This phenomenon was the result of the collapsing housing market
and falling home prices rather than escalating mortgage debt. Ask Dr. Econ: Where Can I Find
Statistics on Housing Net Worth and Mortgage Debt?, FED. RES. BANK S.F. (Oct. 2009),
http://www.frbsf.org/education/activities/drecon/answerxml.cfm?selectedurl=/2009/0910.html.
123. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
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would be protected in or out of bankruptcy. This, in fact, would be an
attractive plan, as long as she remains a resident and does not go into
bankruptcy during the three-year and four-month time period.
One difficulty is that the Code may permit her creditors to force her
into involuntary bankruptcy under certain circumstances.124 If that
happens, her homestead exemption is no longer determined by the law
of New State but by the Code. Another difficulty is that the pressure of
creditor action, including garnishment of her wages and seizure of her
nonexempt property, may leave her unable to survive financially outside
of bankruptcy. If this occurs, she may have no practical choice other
than to file what is called a “voluntary” petition for bankruptcy relief.
The petition is voluntary in name only. In point of fact, her financial
situation leaves her no choice.
The financial impact on Debtor can be made to vary according to her
mortgage indebtedness and the value of her home. The higher the
mortgage debt and the less the home value, the less home equity Debtor
would have, causing less need for homestead exemption protection of
that equity. However, at any fixed home value, the more Debtor has
paid on her mortgage, the greater the risk that she will be adversely
affected. This is true because in a market with stable home values, as
Debtor pays down her mortgage, she increases her home equity. As her
home equity increases, so does her need for the protection afforded by a
homestead exemption.125
Married couples filing jointly could also be affected in the same way.
Because they normally share a home and pool their homestead
exemptions, however, the effect may be somewhat less frequent and
less dramatic.126 A married couple’s ability to claim the homestead
exemption allowed to each of them means they may combine their
homestead exemptions. This permits couples filing as joint debtors to
double the amount of the homestead exemption applicable to their
home.127 The utilization of the combined homestead exemptions
124. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-327, § 2(9), 124 Stat. 3557, 3558 (explaining that a debtor may be forced into an
involuntary bankruptcy if three or more creditors file a petition and their combined claims are
more than a certain dollar amount).
125. Though residential real estate markets currently are down nationwide, in a time of rising
home values, Debtor will experience increased home equity even when paying only the interest
on her mortgage. This is because with a fixed amount of mortgage indebtedness, her rising home
value will continue to increase her home equity. Thus, this situation presents another instance in
which Debtor needs greater homestead exemption protection.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1), (p)(1).
127. Id. § 522(b)(1). Married couples filing jointly are required to elect the same set of
exemptions, whether federal or state. When the couple is unable to agree, they are deemed to
elect the federal exemptions whenever the federal exemptions are available under the laws of the
applicable jurisdiction. Id.
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affords a much higher level of protection for the couple’s home equity
and safeguards the home.
As the typical single head of household with dependents, it is Debtor
who stands to suffer the greatest loss of homestead exemption and the
greatest hardship. Understandably, Debtor needs—and may often
have—a home comparable in value to her married counterpart because
her total household may be the same size as a married couple’s
household. In fact, she may have more dependents than the prototypical
married couple.128 For that reason, her home value and home equity
may conceivably be higher. Unfortunately, she has no spouse with
whom to combine her homestead exemption. So, while Debtor may
have the greater need for homestead exemption protection, she finds
herself with less.
Debtor suffers the same dilemma whether she is moving between
states with unlimited homestead exemptions, or from a state with a
limited homestead exemption that has a dollar cap greater than her
home equity. In each situation, Debtor has the protection of a
homestead exemption that is sufficient to protect her entire home equity.
As a result, a bankruptcy filing in her current domicile offers her the
greatest possibility of complete protection of her home equity.
On a macro level, the magnitude of the dilemma for debtors and the
concomitant societal problem are more clearly seen in light of the
statistical data on insolvency in America. According to some
economists, there are millions of families who would be better off
financially if they sought bankruptcy relief.129 By one estimate,
approximately 17% of all households in the United States would benefit
from a bankruptcy filing, compared to the 1.5 million that actually
filed.130 This suggests that at least 16.5 million families are struggling
to pay their debts for some reason that has nothing to do with their
eligibility to seek relief.131 It appears that these families are attempting
to avoid bankruptcy as best they can. Neither they, nor society, benefits
from a rule that would push them closer toward bankruptcy.
B. Counsel’s Conundrum
Although the purpose of the five BAPCPA look-back periods is to
control exemption eligibility and stop bankruptcy abuse, the law has had
other unintended consequences. One of these has been to make the job

128.
A1.
129.
130.
131.

Joe Frolick, The Out-Of-Wedlock Baby Boom, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 28, 1993, at
WARREN & WARREN TYAGI, supra note 91, at 73.
Id.
Id.
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of debtor’s counsel more challenging. As noted above, the reforms alter
the pre-filing analysis needed to ascertain exemption eligibility in many
ways.132
Counsel’s ability to assess the debtor’s exemption eligibility status
with confidence prior to seeking relief in bankruptcy is crucial. This is
because without such assessment, the debtor may be unable to retain
properties considered exempt at the time of filing.133 This risk
associated with counsel’s inability to correctly determine exemption
eligibility is heightened by the fact that the debtor may be unable to
dismiss her bankruptcy filing and return to her pre-filing status.134
If counsel is unaware of the relevant look-back periods or unable to
predict which exemptions may be claimed, then the debtor has no way
of knowing what property she may keep. The reality is that she may
become trapped in a bankruptcy that cannot be dismissed and learn only
too late that she could lose most, if not all, of her property. In other
words, the ability of counsel to gauge the debtor’s exemption eligibility
is key to the success of the bankruptcy filing and the debtor’s fresh start.
Counsel’s ability to provide reliable advice regarding exemptions
poses special ethical problems to the extent that there is confusion about
which law governs. An attorney can err in a number of ways. For
instance, to the extent reasonably necessary, a lawyer must explain a
matter so that the client can make informed decisions regarding the
representation.135 In addition, a lawyer is called on to abide by a
132. See supra Parts I.C–D.
133. At least one court has noted the unintended consequences that may result from the new
provisions related to exemption eligibility. See In re Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, 447 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2010) (“The sponsors try to claim that they have closed the [millionaire’s] loophole by
placing certain restrictions on State homestead exemptions. While true, these restrictions still
leave the unlimited homestead exemption largely intact for most wealthy debtors. To the extent
that the restrictions may prevent some forms of abuse, they will also have unintended
consequences that might harm innocent debtors who inadvertently run afoul of the complex new
rules attached to exempt property. The bill does not place an absolute national dollar cap on
homestead exemptions. People who, with the exceptions made in the bill as described below,
would otherwise be entitled to an unlimited homestead exemption, would still be able to claim the
exemption. The bill does not alter the opt-out rule in the Bankruptcy Code, so there is still no
federal floor.”).
134. Courts have recognized that prejudice to creditors would occur if debtors were allowed to
dismiss and re-file in order to rectify a failure to properly secure a homestead exemption, and
have denied motions for dismissal in this circumstance. Mendez v. Salven (In re Salven), 367
B.R. 109, 120 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Hall, 15 B.R. 913, 917 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1981); In re
Astin, 77 B.R. 537, 538 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1987); see also 11 U.S.C. § 707 (2006), amended by
Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(25), 124 Stat. 3557,
3560 (discussing standards for dismissal); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1017(a) (“Except as provided in §§
707(a)(3), 707(b), 1208(b), and 1307(b) of the Code, and in Rule 1017(b), (c) and (e), a case shall
not be dismissed on motion of the petitioner, for want of prosecution or other cause, or by consent
of the parties, before a hearing on notice as provided in Rule 2002.”).
135. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2007).
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client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and
consult with the client as to the means by which the objectives are to be
pursued.136 This means that the client is entitled to know what legal
options are available in any given situation. It also means that it is the
lawyer’s responsibility to identify the possible courses of action and
explain the advantages and disadvantages of each.
These ethical obligations go hand-in-hand with an attorney’s
obligation to act competently,137 zealously,138 and with due
diligence.139 In this context, it is the lawyer’s ethical obligation to
make sense of applicable state and federal law and relate it to the client
in a way that enables the client to understand and respond.140 Anything
less places both the debtor and her counsel at risk.
1. Challenging Choices
Advising a client about her various options prior to the bankruptcy
filing is often called “pre-bankruptcy planning” or “insolvency
planning.” Engaging in pre-bankruptcy planning raises questions about
the propriety of an attorney and client discussing a debtor’s potential
transfer of assets or the debtor’s plans to incur additional debt.
Questions directed at counsel by the debtor, such as whether to transfer
an asset, whether to incur more debt, whether to pay certain debts, and
whether to relocate, are all typical and relevant.141 It is important to
note that the Code and case law permit a debtor to engage in prebankruptcy planning.142 This may include changes in the form of assets
136. Id. R. 1.2(a).
137. Id. R. 1.1.
138. Id. pmbl. at para. 8.
139. Id. R. 1.3.
140. Id. R. 1.4(b).
141. This statement is anecdotal. These questions commonly arose during the author’s thirtyfive years in practice, which included representation of debtors, creditors, and service as a
bankruptcy trustee.
142. Compare Hanson v. First Nat’l Bank in Brookings (In re First Nat’l Bank in Brookings),
848 F.2d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that debtor’s conversion of nonexempt property to
exempt property on eve of bankruptcy for express purpose of placing that property beyond reach
of creditors, without more, will not deprive debtor of exemption to which he otherwise would be
entitled), with Norwest Bank Neb., N.A. v. Tveten (In re Tveten), 848 F.2d 871, 875 (8th Cir.
1988) (ruling that permitting debtor to convert all of his major non-exempt assets into sheltered
property on the eve of bankruptcy with actual intent to defraud his creditors “would constitute a
perversion of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code” (citing First Tex. Sav. Ass’n, Inc. v. Reed (In
re Reed), 700 F.2d 986, 992 (5th Cir. 1983))). But see In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 84 (8th Cir.
1989) (holding debtor’s conversion of property into homestead property did not in itself establish
fraud). See also In re Addison, 540 F.3d 805, 813–14 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that indicia of
fraud may include conveyances for less than adequate consideration, converting substantially all
non-exempt property to exempt property, borrowing of funds in order to purchase exempt assets,
or debtor’s concealment of pre-bankruptcy attempts to reduce non-exempt property available for
payment of creditor claims); In re Jennings, 533 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing
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from nonexempt to exempt. Because the law allows this conduct to
occur under certain circumstances, it is the ethical obligation of counsel
to assist the client in discerning the line between prudent and imprudent
behavior and between lawful and unlawful conduct.143 Counseling
insolvent debtors about exemption eligibility falls under this same
category.
Any advice by counsel must be governed not only by the rules of
ethics, but by the Code and case law. This is because attorneys are
specifically prohibited by the Code from advising the insolvent client to
incur more debt.144 However, incurring more debt may be in the
client’s best interest. Sometimes, the use of credit may be the client’s
only hope for avoiding or forestalling bankruptcy.
For these reasons, professional ethics is at the intersection of the
lawyer’s obligation to advise the client and the Code’s prohibition
regarding what kind of advice the lawyer may give. This difficult issue
was confronted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States.145 The Court held that the Code only
prohibits an attorney from advising a debtor to manipulate the
protections of the bankruptcy system by “loading up” on debt with the
expectation of obtaining its discharge, conduct that is abusive per se.146
This issue relates to counsel’s obligation to advise her client regarding
exemption eligibility and is important because it highlights that lawyers
are merely restricted from counseling a debtor to engage in abusive
conduct.147 There is no restraint on an attorney’s obligation to advise
the debtor on other matters, including exemption eligibility.
2. The Certainty of Uncertainty
There is a threshold problem for counsel seeking a firm grasp of
exemption eligibility issues. State exemption laws were generally
designed to protect residents, rather than nonresidents, from creditors’
claims.148 There is often no clear statement in state law regarding the
that conversion of non-exempt to exempt assets is acceptable unless it is motivated by actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors); In re Wilmoth, 397 B.R. 915, 919 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2008) (discussing that there is no bright-line rule as to when conversion of non-exempt property
to exempt property is fraudulent, and that courts have considerable discretion in making that
determination).
143. E.g., Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1331 (2010).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 526(a)(4) (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(20)(B), 124 Stat. 3557, 3560.
145. 130 S. Ct. at 1329.
146. Id. at 1336.
147. Id.
148. See In re Morrell, 394 B.R. 405, 415 (N.D.W.V. 2008) (stating that the legislative history
supports a State interest in restricting its exemptions to its residents (citing William J. Woodward,
Exemptions, Opting Out, and Bankruptcy Reform, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 364 (1982))).
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extraterritorial application of state exemption laws.149 A debtor who
has not resided in a particular jurisdiction for two years is unlikely to
have sufficient ties to the state to have domicile for exemption
eligibility purposes. In other words, state law is often silent concerning
whether its exemption laws protect a debtor’s property beyond its
borders.
A debtor may find herself in a number of different scenarios
depending on the interpretation of the extraterritorial effect of a state’s
exemption laws. For example, a state constitution may not address
whether the state’s exemptions are given extraterritorial effect.150 In
this situation, some bankruptcy courts have interpreted state exemption
laws to have no extraterritorial effect, causing a debtor whose
homestead property is located out of state to be ineligible for the
exemption, and, instead, forcing the debtor to elect to use the federal
homestead exemption under the savings clause.151 In contrast, other
jurisdictions have interpreted state exemption laws to have
extraterritorial effect.152 These courts allow the debtor to claim the state
homestead exemption for property located outside of the look-back state
when its exemption law applies.
Even when state law is clear as to its extraterritorial application,
outcomes may be difficult to predict. North Carolina law contains a
provision that says exemptions are not given extraterritorial effect.153
149. BROWN ET AL., supra note 25, at app. C.
150. E.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (amended 1968), preempted by In re Osejo, 447 B.R. 352
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
151. In re Adams, 375 B.R. 532, 535 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007) (discussing that at the time of
filing, the debtors had resided in a home in Missouri for 440 days. Debtors had resided in Florida
for the majority of the 180-day period immediately preceding the 730-day period before filing, so
Florida exemption law applied. Because Florida exemption law is not given extraterritorial
effect, the debtors’ only option was to use the federal homestead exemption.); see also In re
Nickerson, 375 B.R. 869, 872 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007) (stating that a party who was not
domiciled in Missouri when she filed her petition was not eligible for the state’s exemptions); In
re West, 352 B.R. 905, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (stating that Florida’s exemptions are not
extraterritorial).
152. Accord In re Stratton, 269 B.R. 716, 718–19 (Bankr. D. Or. 2001); see In re Jevne, 387
B.R. 301, 302, 304–05 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008) (ruling that the Rhode Island homestead
exemption statute could be given extraterritorial effect to cover a Florida home); In re Smith, No.
07-20614, 2009 WL 1109831, at *1–2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (holding that Louisiana
exemptions applied to debtors who were domiciled in Texas property for 230 days prior to filing
and had been domiciled in Louisiana for the 500 preceding days because Louisiana was an optout state), withdrawn in part, Aug. 26, 2010; see also In re Drenttel, 403 F.3d 611, 614–15 (8th
Cir. 2005) (explaining that although the Minnesota homestead statute does not address its
extraterritorial application, the court considered the purpose of the statute and the protection of
the debtor’s homestead and family, and construed the exemption statute in favor of the debtor’s
residence in Arizona).
153. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1C-1601(a) (1981) (“[E]ach individual, resident of this State, who is a
debtor is entitled to retain free of the enforcement of the claims of creditors.” (emphasis added));
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However, a Texas bankruptcy court held that the BAPCPA provision
that required debtors to look to North Carolina exemption law
preempted the North Carolina provision denying extraterritorial
effect.154 Bankruptcy court decisions interpreting state exemption law
may even conflict within judicial districts and create problems in
predicting exemption eligibility.155 This uncertainty makes it difficult
for an attorney to advise a client with confidence, and the cost and time
necessitated by an appeal makes resolution of the issues through
appellate review difficult for an insolvent debtor.
For instance, consider the host of possibilities created by BAPCPA as
its reforms relate to the relocating debtor’s eligibility for exemptions.156
The look-back period may reveal that a particular debtor was previously
domiciled in any of the fifty states, the District of Columbia, a U.S.
territory, or a foreign country. Whether a debtor is eligible to claim the
exemptions in the look-back state at the time of filing is a question
answered by reference to local law.157 The forum court in the state
where the bankruptcy is filed interprets state law in making that
determination. As a result, bankruptcy judges may reach different
conclusions when resolving this issue.158 This has the potential to be
see also In re Owings, 140 F. 739, 741 (E.D.N.C. 1905) (stating that the exemption law of North
Carolina has no extraterritorial force (citing Balk v. Harris, 30 S.E. 318, 318 (N.C. 1898))).
154. See In re Garrett, 435 B.R. 434, 437, 454 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2010) (explaining that debtor
filed bankruptcy in Texas within the 730-day look-back period. North Carolina was the lookback state, and its exemption law applied. Although North Carolina exemption law is not applied
extraterritorially, the bankruptcy court ruled that § 522(b)(3)(a) pre-empted the North Carolina
exemptions statute and the North Carolina exemption was available to the debtor regardless of the
residency requirement.).
155. See In re Katseanes, No. 07-40168-JDP, 2007 WL 2962637, at *3 (Bankr. D. Id. 2007)
(discussing the fact that court decisions as to extraterritorial application may also vary within
circuits); see also In re Capps, 438 B.R. 668, 672–73 (Bankr. D. Id. 2010) (finding that although
the Ninth Circuit had ruled that the California homestead exemption statute should be given
extraterritorial effect, this decision did not control and that the Idaho homestead exemption law
did not have extraterritorial effect, as Idaho’s state goals underlying exemptions differed from
those of California).
156. For example, the number of potential combinations of jurisdictions (current domiciliary
state and former domiciliary state) is the square of the sum of the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, the four U.S. territories, and the possible foreign domiciliary, totaling 3136 (56 x 56).
What makes the determination of exemption eligibility challenging is identifying each
jurisdiction’s domiciliary requirements, determining its opt-out status, and interpreting the
extraterritorial application of its law. Bankruptcy law looks to state law to decide whether and
when the debtor’s domicile was abandoned in one state and established in another. Because this
is largely a matter of physical presence and intent, the debtor may be found to have abandoned a
domicile in one state without having established a domicile in another state, or vice versa. For
exemption eligibility, the debtor may have only one domicile at a time. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text (describing cases related to the determination of the debtor’s domicile).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
158. Compare In re Battle, 366 B.R. 635, 636 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (holding that the
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particularly troublesome when different holdings on the same facts
occur within the same judicial district.159 In short, this area of the law
can be a minefield for counsel and client.
C. Conflicting Case Law and Commentary
Sometimes complexity of analysis is necessary to achieve justice or
other important social goals. In this instance, the confusion that exists
regarding exemption eligibility does not serve the ends of justice or any
other meaningful purpose.
The law lacks clarity, and its
unpredictability fails to serve the debtor or the creditors, working a
needless hardship on the bar and bench.
A relocating homeowner on the brink of insolvency, who is seeking
employment in another state with no ulterior motive, should not be
required to put her home equity at risk. This is a no-win situation for
the debtor. If the debtor resides in a state with a more favorable
homestead exemption, the law creates a financial incentive to file
bankruptcy preemptively rather than risk the loss of the homestead
exemption or forego the employment. This serves neither the debtor’s
interest nor the creditors’ interest. In this situation, the bankruptcy
system forces the debtor, who is striving to avoid bankruptcy, to
succumb to filing to prevent the loss of her homestead exemption or the
loss of an employment opportunity.
Professor Laura B. Bartell offered one approach to the interpretation
of § 522(b)(3)(A) and the savings clause in an article on this subject.160
The thesis of the article suggests that the doctrine of federal preemption
permits the imposition of exemption eligibility in the look-back state
under the Supremacy Clause without reference to exemption eligibility
under the domiciliary requirements of state law.161 This approach has
been embraced by more than one court.162 However, this particular
Florida residency restriction was not pre-empted by § 522(b)(3)(a)’s choice of law provision that
Florida exemption laws applied to the debtor, and that because the Florida opt-out law is limited
to residents, the nonresident debtor was able to elect federal exemptions under the savings
clause), with In re Camp, 396 B.R. 194, 202–03 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding that the
Florida residency restriction was pre-empted by the choice of law provision in § 522(b)(3)(a) and
that Florida exemption laws applied to the debtor and precluded the nonresident debtor from
choosing exemptions under the savings clause), rev’d, 631 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2011).
159. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
160. See generally Laura B. Bartell, The Peripatetic Debtor: Choice of Law and Choice of
Exemptions, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 401 (2006) (suggesting an interpretation of the look-back
provision).
161. Id.
162. See In re Camp, 396 B.R. at 202–03 (holding that the federal choice of law provision in §
522(b)(3)(A) preempted Florida’s limitation to “residents” in the opt-out statute and in the
substantive exemption law). The Camp decision was reversed by the Fifth Circuit, though on
different grounds. See Camp v. Ingalls (In re Camp), 631 F.3d 757, 761 (5th Cir. 2011)
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interpretation of the savings clause has not gained widespread
acceptance. Other courts have ruled that the approach fails to recognize
the significance of the savings clause in the interpretation of the
provision.163
The operative phrase in the savings clause has a condition precedent:
if the domiciliary requirement renders the debtor “ineligible for any
exemption,” the debtor may elect to exempt property under the federal
exemptions.164 This phrase in the savings clause can have no meaning
unless the domiciliary requirement can render the debtor “ineligible for
any exemption.” Simply put, the debtor would never need the benefit of
the savings clause if the debtor could never be disqualified from
exemption eligibility by the effect of the domiciliary requirement. The
notion that Congress intended to superimpose the exemptions of the
look-back state on the debtor through preemption without regard to a
domiciliary requirement for eligibility under state law at the time of
filing has not gained traction in the courts.165
Conflicting provisions of a statute must be harmonized whenever
possible through a statutory construction that reconciles the
provisions.166 In the present context, it is only by acknowledging that a
debtor may be “ineligible for any exemption” that the savings clause
and the look-back provision can be construed in a way that gives
meaning to both. Courts, however, have not adopted this approach, and
the conflicting decisions work a financial hardship on those in our
society who can least afford it.
(reversing Camp’s ruling that Florida’s “opt-out” ruling applied to persons not residents of
Florida, despite the language in the statute expressly stating that it applied to residents of Florida,
on plain meaning grounds). The Fifth Circuit stated that, because of its ruling on this issue, it did
not reach the corollary issues regarding whether § 522(b)(3)(A) preempted state law restrictions
on extraterritorial application of a state’s exemption law and whether the savings clause at the
conclusion of § 522(b)(3) permitted debtors to claim federal exemptions when the applicable state
both enacted an opt-out law and prohibited the extraterritorial application of the state’s
exemptions. Id. at 761 n.3. Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve these issues in Camp. See also
In re Smith, No. 07-20614, 2009 WL 1109831, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2009) (following Camp
without analysis); In re Battle, 366 B.R. 635, 636 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (following a different
approach, with which the Camp court disagreed).
163. See, e.g., In re Battle, 366 B.R. at 636 (holding Florida opt-out law limited to “residents”
and thus non-resident who had moved from Florida within 730 days was governed by Florida law
and able to elect federal exemptions); accord In re Crandall, 346 B.R. 220, 221–22 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2006); In re Underwood, 342 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 2006); In re Chandler, 362
B.R. 723, 726–27 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2007) (stating that Georgia’s opt-out law is limited to
debtors “whose domicile is in Georgia” and thus not applicable to a nonresident who had
relocated to West Virginia).
164. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A) (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
165. In re Fernandez, 445 B.R. 790, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2011); BROWN ET AL., supra note
25, § 4:5 at 82.
166. Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981).
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D. The Dollars and Cents of Domiciliary Happenstance
1. The Creditors’ Calamity
The case may be made that the exemption eligibility reforms of
BAPCPA are inequitable to debtors and create an unnecessarily arcane
analysis paradigm for the bar and bench. But creditors also stand to
suffer from the reforms as well. The unfairness of the reforms to
creditors is both discernible and dramatic.
There is no obvious reason to explain why a debtor should benefit
disproportionately and at creditors’ expense from having fortuitously
domiciled in states that grant bountiful exemptions merely because the
debtor domiciled there for a few months during the past two and onehalf years. Current law creates the possibility of such a random result
caused by the identification of a coincidental look-back state that allows
a nonresident debtor to claim its homestead exemption.167
In other words, the six-month look-back period is so short that even a
residency of a few months within that narrow window of time can allow
a debtor to control where a debtor lived during the longest portion of the
look-back period. This control may enable the debtor to alter the
identity of the look-back state through the timing of the bankruptcy
filing.
The purpose of the look-back period in determining domiciliary
eligibility for exemptions is to combat bankruptcy abuse by preventing
a debtor from gaining financial advantage over creditors. For example,
the debtor may relocate to a domiciliary jurisdiction with more
favorable exemption laws during the two-year period prior to filing.168
It makes sense that a debtor should not be able to relocate to another
state and shelter assets that would otherwise be available to pay
creditors’ claims. To allow this type of conduct would create a financial
incentive for debtors to avoid creditors in this fashion.
By the same token, debtors should not gain financial advantage

167. An example would be a debtor who domiciled in Minnesota longer than any other state
during the six-month look-back period two years preceding the bankruptcy filing. Because
Minnesota state law allows a nonresident debtor to claim its homestead exemption, a debtor could
use Minnesota’s homestead exemption to protect up to $360,000 of the debtor’s home equity.
MINN. STAT. §§ 510.01–.02 (2010); see also In re Drenttel, 403 F.3d 611, 614–15 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that a homestead exemption may be claimed to exempt an out-of-state property when the
state homestead exemption statute itself does not preclude use of the homestead exemption for an
out-of-state property).
168. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327; § 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1)–(2); see also 147 Cong. Rec. H517 (daily ed. Mar.
1, 2001) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“The purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy
law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and
ensure that the system is fair for both the debtors and creditors.”).
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through exemption eligibility at the creditors’ expense due to the
fortuity of having lived for a brief period of time in a state with
favorable exemptions. To allow debtors to control the identity of the
look-back state by timing the filing of the bankruptcy merely
encourages gaming of a different sort. The debtor is in control of the
decision to move or to file in order to interrupt a domiciliary period, and
the debtor may either delay filing or prolong a stay to lengthen a
domiciliary period. Either way, under current law, the debtor may
affect the length of a former domiciliary period in a way that is
financially advantageous.
Perhaps the most insidious threat to creditors is the financial
incentive to file bankruptcy that the reforms offer to a relocating
homeowner. As discussed earlier, the BAPCPA reforms encourage
preemptive filing by relocating homeowners to avoid the risk of losing
an existing homestead exemption. Regardless of the amount of the
debtor’s existing homestead exemption protection, if the amount is
sufficient to protect most, if not all, of the debtor’s home equity, the
debtor gambles that equity by moving out of state without first filing
bankruptcy.
By filing preemptively, the debtor has the opportunity to both
preserve her home equity and accept the new job in another state. This
is because the estate of the debtor is viewed as of the date of filing.
Assuming the debtor has lived in her home in her current domicile for
three years and four months, she may claim the full homestead
exemption of her domicile at the time of filing. She may then
confidently leave the state, having fixed her entitlement to the
homestead protection under the exemption on the filing date of her
petition.
Because there is no statistical information compiled regarding the
post-filing interstate migration of debtors, there is no way to determine
whether and with what frequency preemptive filing may occur. For all
intents and purposes, a preemptive filing would appear on the docket of
the bankruptcy court as a case like any other. Only the debtor and
debtor’s counsel would have reason to know the motivating factors
behind the debtor’s decision to file. Even so, for every preemptive
filing that occurs because a relocating debtor is unwilling to risk her
home equity, creditors suffer the loss.
The unsecured creditors, who have no collateral, lose the entire
amount owed.169 The secured creditors, whose collateral may be worth
less than the amount owed, also lose the under-secured portion of their
169. 11 U.S.C. § 726, amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-327, § 2(a)(28), 124 Stat. 3557, 3560.
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debt.170 And, finally, even the secured creditors, whose collateral is
valued at the amount that is owed, may suffer because the relocating
debtor chooses to surrender the property as a way of reducing her debt
load.171 The debtor can more easily surrender the property when there
is no potential threat of personal liability. In sum, to the extent that the
BAPCPA reforms encourage eligibility gaming and preemptive filing,
creditors have little to gain and much to lose.
2. Residential Roulette
While creditors’ interests are not well served by the reforms, it is the
relocating debtor who stands to lose the most. The debtor with the
misfortune of domiciling for a few months in a look-back state with
exemptions of limited value may suffer accordingly.172 This is true
despite the fact that the debtor domiciled in states with generous
exemptions for most of the entire two-and-a-half-year period prior to
filing. Conceivably, the debtor may have owned her home and
domiciled most of her life in a state with an unlimited homestead
exemption except for one brief domiciliary foray into another state
during the look-back period. Based on this brief domiciliary excursion,
the law could require her to forfeit the unlimited homestead exemption
to which she was entitled for all but a few months of her domiciliary
history. Once the look-back state is established, the debtor’s eligibility
to claim exemptions under the law of the look-back state is ascertained
as of the “date of the filing of the petition.”173 The consequences, good
or bad, flow from the determination of the look-back state’s identity and
its residency requirements for exemption eligibility.
3. The Hapless, Hopeless Homeowner
It seems fair that the look-back period for a debtor who is a felon
should be longer than for an ordinary homeowner. What seems odd is
that the dollar cap for each is the same. Moreover, there is an exception
for the debtor who is a felon that does not exist for the honest
homeowner. If the debtor who is a convicted felon needs the homestead
interest for the support of herself or her family, the dollar cap may be
lifted.174 There is no similar exception for the non-felon homeowner
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. An example would be a debtor who domiciled in Maryland longer than any other state
during the look-back period. Maryland allows a nonresident debtor some exemptions that are
limited in amount. S.B. 169, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011).
173. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559. But see supra note 21 and accompanying
text (discussing constitutional challenges to BAPCPA).
174. 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(2).
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who has not owned and lived in her home the requisite three-year and
four-month period.175 The law grants the court no authority to consider
whether the home equity that the non-felon homeowner loses may be
essential to the support of her family. Neither does the law consider
whether the loss of that equity may cause the loss of her home through a
sale in bankruptcy if she cannot raise the money to buy back her lost
home equity.176
In contrast, the homeowner with a felony conviction within five years
of filing bankruptcy, who has lived in her home for three years and four
months, is not subject to the dollar cap under that provision.177 The
reason is that her domiciliary period suffices to avoid the dollar cap
under the three-year and four-month look-back period. The felon is still
subject to a dollar cap in the same amount based on the conviction
within the five-year period preceding the filing.178 In short, the felon is
subject to the same dollar cap, but for a different reason. It is based on
the conviction rather than the duration of the period of domicile and
home ownership.179 Thus, assuming the home equity of each is the
same, it would seem that both would lose the same amount of home
equity because of the dollar cap. However, under BAPCPA, that may
not be the case.
The difference in the predicament of the honest homeowner and the
felon homeowner is that one of them may apply to the court for relief
from the dollar cap to the extent the property is needed for her support
or the support of her family. Sadly, the debtor who may seek the
court’s assistance is not the honest homeowner—rather, it is the felon.

175. For example, suppose an honest homeowner buys a home and domiciles in a state for
three years and three months. She is eligible for the homestead exemption under the law of the
domicile because she has lived there for the required two-year period. Yet, should she be forced
to seek bankruptcy relief, she would be subject to the dollar cap on her home equity because she
falls within the three-year and four-month look-back period. In short, her lack of one additional
month of continued domicile costs her the loss of any home equity that exceeds the dollar cap.
176. It may be argued that the value of the homestead exemption that is lost is not “home
equity” in that it no longer belongs to the debtor but to her estate in bankruptcy. This view
disregards the fact that the amount she lost was counted as her home equity until the moment of
her bankruptcy filing. As a practical matter, what was her home equity prior to the bankruptcy
filing was not lost through depreciation of the home’s value or through incurring additional debt.
Rather, the protection the debtor enjoyed under the state homestead exemption is lost because the
federal dollar cap overrides the state law exemption when the debtor files. It is the preemption of
state law by federal bankruptcy law that precipitates the loss of the incremental portion of home
equity that exceeds the dollar cap. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that federal law
preempts conflicting state law); 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical
Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559 (stating that
debtors may utilize state-law exemptions).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(2).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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While the hyperbole in the example may be unnecessary, there is a
fundamental inequity that should not exist. The larger issue is not
whether a convicted felon should be allowed to keep that portion of a
homestead exemption that is reasonably necessary for the support of her
family. She should. The critical question is why the same concern
cannot be shown to a homeowner with no record of wrongdoing.
III. THE NEED FOR REFORM
A. The Current Assumptions Underlying Abuse Prevention
An amendment to the Code is needed to provide clarity in the law,
minimize the potential for conflicting court decisions, and restore
fairness to all parties. This can be done in a way that accomplishes the
original goals of BAPCPA—closing the mansion loophole and
preventing relocation intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,
while avoiding the negative consequences to honest relocating
debtors.180
Implicit in Congress’ decision to combat fraud through the look-back
provisions are three basic assumptions. The first assumption is that
there is a period of time beyond which it is improbable that individuals
will relocate to a new domiciliary jurisdiction to avoid creditors’ claims.
This assumption is driven by the idea that a debtor generally will not be
able to plan ahead for some period of years in order to take advantage of
creditors and abuse the bankruptcy system. This notion is seen in the
number and type of look-back periods designed to prevent the
relocation of debtors at creditors’ expense.181 It is important to note
that all but one of the look-back periods ignore whether the move
affects the debtor’s relative financial position under the exemption laws
of the look-back state versus the current domiciliary state outside of
bankruptcy. Likewise, all but one of the look-back periods disregards
the effect of the debtor’s relocation on creditors. The six-month lookback period merely serves to identify the law of the jurisdiction that
begins the exemption eligibility analysis.182
The second assumption is that there must be a limit on the value of an
exempt homestead property that may be claimed by a relocating debtor.
In other words, there must be a dollar cap that will restrict the amount
that the debtor may shield from creditors through the homestead
exemption of a new jurisdiction.183 This seems an obvious way to stop
180. Evans & Lewis, supra note 4, at 334.
181. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17)(A), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559; 11 U.S.C. § (p)(1).
182. Id. § 522(b)(3)(A).
183. Id. § 522(p)(1). The limit on the value of exempt homestead property includes real or
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the sheltering of assets in a large homestead exemption. The imposition
of a federal dollar cap on the amount of any state homestead exemption
preempts state law and controls the amount of any sheltered assets.184
This assumption is given effect through the imposition of a dollar cap
imposed on the amount of any homestead exemption when the debtor
has not lived in the current domiciliary state for the three-year and fourmonth look-back period.185 This provision applies regardless of the law
of the current domiciliary state, the look-back state (including the
debtor’s immediate former domiciliary state), or any intermediate
former domiciliary state within the three-year and four-month period
prior to filing.186 In other words, the federal dollar cap preempts the
law of any other state with regard to the relocated debtor, who is in
bankruptcy.
The three-year and four-month look-back provision is similar to the
two-year look-back provision in that it disregards whether the debtor
would otherwise be eligible for exemptions under the law of the current
domiciliary state. Neither provision considers whether or to what extent
the debtor’s relative financial position vis-à-vis creditors would
change.187
The third assumption is that the statutory controls in the first two
assumptions will prevent relocating debtors from engaging in
exemption gaming to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors. The idea is
that the look-back periods, coupled with the dollar caps, will prevent the
sheltering of assets in a state homestead exemption. In short, the final
assumption is that the provisions predicated on these assumptions will
close the mansion loophole and minimize or eliminate exemption
abuse.188

personal property that the debtor or a dependent uses as a residence, a cooperative that owns
property that the debtor or a dependent uses as a residence, a burial plot for the debtor or a
dependent of the debtor, and real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent claims as a
homestead. Id.
184. See U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2 (containing the Supremacy Clause, which dictates that
federal law controls over opposing state law).
185. Note that there are exceptions to this limitation. Pursuant to § 522(p)(2)(A), the dollar
cap is made inapplicable to a family farmer claiming an exemption for a principal residence under
§ 522(b)(3)(A). In addition, pursuant to § 522(p)(2)(B), for purposes of § 522(p)(1), the debtor’s
interest does not include an interest transferred from a debtor’s previous principal residence,
cooperative, burial plot, or homestead (which was acquired prior to the beginning of such 1215day period) into the debtor’s current principal residence, if the debtor’s previous and current
residences are located in the same state. The original dollar caps in the Code are adjusted every
three years to reflect the change in the Consumer Price Index rounded to the nearest $25 pursuant
to § 104(a)–(b). The next scheduled adjustment will be on April 1, 2013.
186. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p)(1).
187. Id.
188. See supra Parts I.C–D.
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B. The Multiple Meanings of “Any”
One reason for statutory change is the confusion that now exists in
the courts and among legal experts with regard to the meaning of the
current provisions.189 A prime example is the construction of the word
“any” in the savings clause.190 According to the interpretation given the
word, it is alternatively argued that its significance markedly changes
the syllogism in the savings clause in one of the following two ways:
(1) If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A)
is to render the debtor ineligible for any [one] exemption [singular],
the debtor may elect to exempt property that is specified under
subsection (d);191 or
(2) If the effect of the domiciliary requirement under subparagraph (A)
is to render the debtor ineligible for any exemption [whatsoever]
[meaning ineligible for all exemptions], the debtor may elect to
exempt property that is specified under subsection (d).192

Under the first interpretation, if the debtor discovers that she is not
eligible for her homestead exemption or any other exemption in the
look-back state, she may elect to claim the federal bankruptcy
exemptions. Even if she is only ineligible for one exemption, she is
brought within the savings clause. This reading aligns with the view
that the debtor should have a full complement of exemptions, whether
state or federal. Without a complete set of exemptions, the debtor may
be left with merely one exemption that may be claimed in theory, but
that has no practical value. That is to say, the debtor would have no
exemptions at all.193
The second reading of the savings clause is radically different from
the first interpretation. That is because eligibility for the federal
exemptions under the savings clause is made to hinge not merely on the
loss of one exemption, but on the loss of every exemption. Under this

189. Compare, e.g., Bierbach v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 393 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
2008) (interpreting the phrase “ineligible for any exemption” to mean ineligible for all
exemptions, thereby denying the debtor eligibility for federal exemptions under the savings
clause), with, e.g., In re Williams, 369 B.R. 470, 472–73 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2007) (suggesting in
dictum that the court would not look favorably on an interpretation of the phrase that would
deprive a debtor of all homestead exemptions).
190. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. For example, this could be the plight of a Pennsylvania debtor, who is deemed eligible to
claim the homestead exemption in Utah, but who is unable to utilize the exemption because of
Utah’s requirement that the homestead property be situated in Utah. See e.g., Stephens v. Win
Holbrook (In re Stephens), 402 B.R. 1, 8 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009) (holding that the savings clause
applied where state law precluded the debtor from claiming the homestead exemption under state
law).
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view, unless the debtor is rendered ineligible for any and all
exemptions, the debtor remains eligible for one. Thus, because the
debtor would not be deemed “ineligible for any exemption,” the debtor
would be denied access to the federal exemptions under the savings
clause.
Normally, statutory interpretation is only needed when the plain
meaning of a word or provision is not self-evident.194 Traditionally,
words are given their ordinary or plain meaning in common usage.195
Assuming the savings clause is ambiguous, the most reasonable
construction would be to read the word “any” as synonymous with
“one” rather than “all” in that it modifies the singular “exemption” in
the sentence structure.
Nevertheless, courts have had difficulty determining what is meant
by the word “any” in the context of the savings clause. As discussed
above, the interpretations given the word “any” in the phrase “ineligible
for any exemption” are strikingly different. Not surprisingly, the
differing interpretations of the word, the phrase, and the savings clause
have led to radically different outcomes for similarly-situated litigants.
Some courts have held that the phrase “ineligible for any exemption”
means that if the debtor is eligible for even one exemption, the debtor is
precluded from electing the federal exemptions pursuant to the savings
clause. These decisions, which construe the word “any” in this context
to mean “all,” either ignore the fact that “any” modifies the singular
noun “exemption,” or supply the word “whatsoever,” making the phrase
read “ineligible for any exemption whatsoever.”196 In effect, these
courts read the passage as though it were written “ineligible for every
exemption.”
However, longstanding case law holds that exemption laws are to be
liberally construed in favor of the debtor to enable the debtor to receive
a fresh start.197 Courts that rely on this case law read “ineligible for any
194. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (“Where the language [of a statute]
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the
rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.” (citing Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175
U.S. 414, 421 (1899))).
195. Id. at 485–86 (“Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears, to
be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.”).
196. Bierbach v. Brooks (In re Brooks), 393 B.R. 80, 86 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re
Katseanes, No. 07-40168-JDP, 2007 WL 2962637, at *3 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007).
197. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1934) (“One of the primary purposes
of the Bankruptcy Act is to ‘relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness,
and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon
business misfortunes.’. . . The various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were adopted in the light
of that view and are to be construed when reasonably possible in harmony with it so as to
effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act. Local rules subversive of that result cannot
be accepted as controlling the action of a federal court.” (quoting Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
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exemption” to mean ineligible for any one exemption or, in other words,
not eligible for the identical exemptions as residents of the look-back
state.198
The need to supply the word “one” following “any” or to supply the
word “whatsoever” following “exemption” should not be necessary.
The meaning is plain, and the phrase easily makes sense when the
words in the phrase are construed together according to their common
usage. The definition of the word “any” permits the meaning to
encompass numerical values from one to some to all, according to
context.199 The context in the savings clause places the word “any”
within the initial dependent phrase of the syllogism modifying the
singular “exemption.”200
Moreover, the only rational purpose of a savings clause is to “save”
the beneficiary of the clause from the loss of exemptions to which the
beneficiary is otherwise entitled. An interpretation that deprives the
debtor of the federal exemptions and all but one state law exemption
based on the debtor’s mere eligibility for only one state exemption
hardly “saves” the debtor’s exemptions.
Such a harsh result does not serve the legislative goal of bankruptcy
abuse prevention. This provision of the Code should be construed to
give effect to the important purposes of (1) stopping blatant relocation
by the debtor to hinder, delay, or defraud the collection of creditors’
claims, and (2) treating the debtor with fairness and compassion when
there is no evidence that the debtor gamed the system to the detriment
of creditors.
A savings clause should do more than merely guarantee eligibility for
one exemption: it should provide parity among debtors. Historically,
debtors have fallen into two groups. Debtors in the opt-out states
received the state exemptions, including the non-bankruptcy federal

Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554–55 (1915))).
198. In re Battle, 366 B.R. 635, 636 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (holding Florida opt-out law is
limited to “residents” and thus nonresident who had moved from Florida within 730 days was
governed by Florida law and able to elect federal exemptions); accord In re Stephens, 402 B.R. 1,
5–6 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2009); In re Wood, No. 5:07-bk-70696 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. June 28, 2007),
http://www.arb.uscourts.gov/orders-rules-opinions/opinions/barry/wood.pdf; In re Crandall, 346
B.R. 220, 221–22 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In re Underwood, 342 B.R. 358, 362 (Bankr. N.D.
Fla. 2006); In re Chandler, 362 B.R. 723, 726–27 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2007) (holding that the
Georgia opt-out law is limited to debtors “whose domicile is in Georgia” and thus not applicable
to a non-resident who had relocated to West Virginia); see also In re Williams, 369 B.R. 470, 474
n. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2007) (“Many state’s opt-out provisions apply only to residents of the
particular state.”).
199. THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS 59 (2003 ed.).
200. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3) (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
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exemptions.201 Debtors in the states that chose not to opt out were
offered a choice between state law exemptions or the federal
exemptions,202 which meant that all debtors received a complete set of
exemptions, whether under the law of a state or under the Code. To
construe the word “any” in a way that denies a relocated debtor a
complete set of exemptions under either state law or federal law creates
a new underclass of debtors who receive less than their non-transient
counterparts in every jurisdiction. This result is unfair and works an
unnecessary hardship on a relocating debtor without any allegation of
ulterior motive, financial gain, or creditor hardship.
C. The Ineffectiveness and Inequity of Current Law
One test of the fairness of the current provision is whether it
considers the exemptions allowed by the debtor’s look-back state
relative to the debtor’s new domiciliary state. If there is no increase in
the value of the exemptions, the debtor has not benefited from
relocation, and the value of property available to satisfy creditors’
claims has not been diminished. In that situation, the debtor should be
allowed to claim exemptions under the laws of the new domiciliary state
because the relocation does not hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
Otherwise, the debtor may suffer merely for relocating while the
creditors reap the windfall of the debtor’s lost homestead equity. This
oppressive result is exemplified when the relocation is employmentrelated or for other legitimate reasons that have nothing to do with
avoiding creditors.
Even when there would be an increase in the value of the debtor’s
claimed exemptions under the law of the current domiciliary state,
detriment to creditors and abuse of the system cannot be assumed. If
the relocation allows the debtor to find employment, obtain medical
coverage, receive better pay, achieve greater job security, start a
business, acquire assets, secure employment for a spouse, or cut living
expenses, the debtor’s financial standing is improved and creditors are
benefited. Relocating to a new state for employment may be necessary
to gain or maintain employment, for career advancement, to assist aging
parents, to have more time with grandchildren, to be closer to essential
health care facilities, or for other reasons that have nothing to do with
avoiding creditors or hindering the collection of creditors’ claims. The
creation of financial disincentives to relocation, on the other hand, may

201. Id.; see also In re Jewell, 347 B.R. 120, 123 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 2006) (holding that
debtors were entitled to the federal exemptions pursuant to the savings clause, notwithstanding
that their current and former states were both opt-out states).
202. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1); see also id. § 522(d) (listing available exemptions).
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harm creditors. Thus, the arbitrary nature of the present rule is
potentially harsh to creditor and debtor alike because it fails to consider
whether the debtor has benefited from the relocation or whether the
creditor has been harmed.203 Bankruptcy abuse prevention in this
context operates as though relocation is a zero-sum game in which it is
unnecessary to identify the financial impact on the parties. Nothing
could be further from the truth.
Debtors, creditors, trustees, and the courts should have a clear regime
that points to the applicable law. The law should provide a system that
is reliable and predictable enough to permit all parties to discern which
property the debtor will retain for her fresh start and which property will
remain subject to creditors’ claims.
D. Gaming the System or Gamed by the System?
The present convoluted system is ineffective and unnecessary.
Congress rightfully acknowledges that exemption gaming may occur in
two principal ways.204 The first way is the outright conversion of
nonexempt assets to exempt assets prior to the filing. The debtor may
accomplish this conversion by disposing of a nonexempt asset and
reinvesting the proceeds in an exempt asset, or by using the proceeds to
pay down secured obligations on exempt assets.205 Historically, this
form of protecting assets has been permissible under certain
circumstances, and, to a point, courts have allowed it.
The rationale behind the case law is that the debtor may need to pay
down a home mortgage or an auto loan as part of a plan to begin a fresh

203. Creditors may be hurt by the rule in several ways. For example, a creditor is less likely
to receive payment when a debtor avoids moving to accept new employment that would enable
her to pay her bills. Creditors are further damaged when a debtor files preemptively to protect her
homestead exemption and the creditors’ debts are discharged. Finally, creditors are damaged
when a debtor’s look-back state is determined by a brief but significant period in her domiciliary
history that lets her claim an unlimited homestead exemption or other generous exemptions, even
though the domiciliary period was merely ninety-one days during the past two to two-and-a-half
years.
204. Not all exemption gaming involves the Code. One non-Code form of gaming that further
reveals the failure of current law to close the mansion loophole is when a bad actor relocates to a
state with favorable exemption laws and disputes or litigates claims until the passage of the
applicable look-back periods. Nationally, the median time interval from case filing to disposition
by trial of federal civil cases terminated during the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2010,
was 23.3 months or nearly two years. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: Caseload Statistics
2010, U.S. COURTS, tbl. C-5, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2010/tables/C05Mar10.pdf (last visited June 1, 2011). In state
courts, the goal for disposition of civil cases through jury trial is 18–24 months. Trial Court
Performance Standards, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, fig.1, http://www.ncsconline.org/
d_research/TCPS/Standards/stan_2.1.htm (last modified Jan. 23, 2005).
205. But cf. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) (disallowing such a transfer if it is fraudulently done).
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start.206 It is only when this conduct is in the extreme that courts and
Congress have intervened––stripping the debtor of any advantage that
would otherwise be derived from the conversion of nonexempt assets to
the creditors’ detriment within ten years of filing.207 It is difficult to
imagine someone planning to file bankruptcy ten years in advance;
however, the provision protects against that contingency.208
The second form of gaming behavior does not involve a change in
the form of the debtor’s assets, but rather the relocation of the debtor to
a new jurisdiction with more favorable exemption laws. The debtor’s
assets become exempt by virtue of the relocation without the necessity
of conversion. Congress has attempted to stop this type of conduct
through use of the look-back periods––denying the debtor access to the
exemption laws of her current domiciliary state, but not always the
forum state.
In contrast, all of the look-back provisions associated with relocation
ascribe much shorter periods of risk. For instance, if the debtor has
resided in the domiciliary state for at least two years, the debtor is
eligible to claim the exemptions available under the laws of the current
domiciliary state, regardless of how favorable the law may be to the
debtor or how detrimental the law may be to creditors. If the debtor has
resided in the current domiciliary state for at least three years and four
months, § 522(p) imposes no dollar cap on the amount of homestead
equity the debtor may claim as exempt.209 For states that have
206. See supra note 142 (citing cases that indicate that a debtor may have a legitimate purpose
for converting non-exempt asset into exempt assets).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) (“For purposes of § 522(b)(3)(A), and notwithstanding subsection (a),
the value [‘value’] meaning fair market value as of the date of the filing] of an interest in . . . [a
homestead] shall be reduced to the extent that such value is attributable to any portion of any
property that the debtor disposed of in the 10-year period ending on the date of the filing of the
petition with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor and that the debtor could not
exempt, or that portion that the debtor could not exempt, under subsection (b), if on such date the
debtor had held the property so disposed of.”).
208. Id.
209. 11 U.S.C. § 522(p) (“[T]o exempt property under State or local law, a debtor may not
exempt any amount of interest that was acquired by the debtor during the 1215-day period
preceding the date of the filing of the petition . . . .” (emphasis added)). There has been some
dispute over the language of § 522(p) as to whether an interest referred to a legal or economic
interest and whether a homestead must be occupied during the entire 1215-day period to qualify
as an interest. See Wallace v. Rogers (In re Rogers), 513 F.3d 212, 227 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The
statutory text and legislative history indicate that the term “interest” refers to vested economic
interests in the property that were acquired by the debtor within the 1215-day period preceding
the filing of the petition.”); In re Presto, 376 B.R. 554, 581 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (finding that
even if a court were to interpret “interest” as referring to legal, as opposed to monetary, interest;
the title to a former marital residence changed following the parties’ divorce). There has also
been a dispute as to whether the increase in equity during the 1215-day period prior to filing of a
homestead acquired more than 1215 days before the filing of the petition is an “interest” of the
kind sufficient to trigger the cap imposed by BAPCPA on debtors’ homestead exemptions.
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unlimited homestead exemptions, this means the entire value of the
debtor’s home equity is shielded from creditors’ claims. The state
exemption laws may be found in the state’s constitution, its statutes, or
its case law. Because of federal preemption,210 the Code’s time
limitations or look-back periods control, as do the dollar caps imposed
on the homestead exemption.211
Given Congress’ acknowledgement of the principal gaming
techniques and its various objectives for prevention of these techniques,
it is clear that Congress felt a multi-faceted approach was needed.
While the legislative objective is noble, the unintended consequences of
both the two-year look-back period under § 522(b)(3)(A) and the
federal dollar cap under § 522(p) must be examined in light of over five
years of experience under BAPCPA. A close review of the effect of
these provisions reveals that each fails to serve its intended purpose, and
each is ineffective in preventing abuse. In addition, each provision,
whether viewed separately or taken together, denies the honest debtor
her fresh start, fails to close the mansion loophole, and inadequately
protects creditors.
The reason for this failure is that, unlike the Code’s provision on
conversion of assets under § 522(o), the look-back provisions in §
522(b)(3)(A) and § 522(p) do not consider whether the debtor’s
relocation has a net effect on the debtor’s ability to increase the value of
her claimed exemptions and thereby shelter additional assets from
creditors’ claims. The failure to address the fundamental question of

Compare In re Blair, 334 B.R. 374, 376–78 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2005) (stating that increased
equity was not an “interest”), and In re Sainlar, 344 B.R. 669, 671–74 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006)
(noting that an “interest” was real property acquired and not increased equity), with Parks v.
Anderson, 406 B.R. 79, 88–95 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009) (holding increased equity is an “interest”).
It has been well established that the homestead cap for those who, according to 11 U.S.C. §
522(p), “elect[ed]” to claim state law exemptions does not make the homestead cap applicable
solely to debtors in states that have not opted out of federal bankruptcy exemptions, and who
accordingly had a choice between state and federal exemptions. See In re Kane, 336 B.R. 477,
484–89 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2006) (explaining that despite its plain and unambiguous language,
BAPCPA’s homestead cap was not intended to apply only to debtors in states that have opted out
of federal bankruptcy exemptions).
210. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
211. The Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to legislate bankruptcy law, coupled
with the Supremacy Clause, allows Congress to preempt and thus override state law as Congress
did in other provisions of BAPCPA, such as 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(3)(B)–(C) and in the hanging
paragraph following §522(b)(3)(C). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (holding that a constitutional grant of power to Congress to legislate in this
area does not create a constitutional right to obtain a discharge).
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fairness to debtors and creditors alike serves to merely alter the strategy
and methodology of the gaming itself, not to prevent its occurrence.
The six-month look-back period is by definition a moving target.
Under prior law, the debtor influenced the applicable exemption
eligibility law by relocating and waiting the requisite time to establish
domicile and exemption eligibility in the new domiciliary
jurisdiction.212 This required that the debtor become a domiciliary
ninety-one days prior to the filing of the petition. Under existing law,
the debtor may also influence the applicable exemption law by
relocating and waiting the requisite time to establish domicile in a
former domiciliary jurisdiction preferred to be the look-back state. The
debtor always has the ability to some degree to influence the applicable
look-back state, whether by filing bankruptcy to interrupt and shorten
the duration of a domiciliary period or by waiting in order to lengthen it.
Just as the debtor’s relocation to a new state interrupts and stops the
running of the debtor’s current domiciliary period, the debtor’s
bankruptcy filing freezes the relative length of each domiciliary within
the look-back period. Thus, by choosing the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy, the debtor may control the relative length of the former
domiciliary period. Each debtor’s ability to manipulate the number,
identity, and duration of domiciles within the look-back period will
hinge on the debtor’s particular circumstances.
When the debtor has had multiple domiciles within any six-month
window of time during the two and a half years preceding the
contemplation of filing, however, the debtor may be able to alter the
identity of the look-back state. The debtor’s motto becomes: “file, if
it’s worthwhile, or wait to create” (a more favorable look-back period).
Simply put, not only has the debtor created domiciliary history, the
debtor is presently creating domiciliary history.
In this manner, the debtor may alter the identity of the look-back
state, and thus affect whether she is eligible or ineligible for exemptions
based on the domiciliary requirements of the look-back state. While
relocation to alter the look-back state is made more difficult according
to the circumstances and migration patterns of the debtor, the
haphazardness of the look-back period may increase the value of the
debtor’s exemptions at the creditors’ expense. Likewise, the honest
debtor may be subjected to the laws of the least favorable jurisdiction
for reasons entirely beyond her control (e.g., a job transfer, medical
necessity, or caregiving).213
212. 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2004) (amended 2006).
213. See Catherine Arnst, Study Links Medical Costs and Personal Bankruptcy, BUS. WK.
(June 4, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/jun2009/db2009064_
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For the debtor who is anticipating relocation from a state with more
favorable exemption laws, the look-back period may precipitate a
bankruptcy filing that could otherwise be avoided. This is because
bankruptcy may be the only way the debtor can prevent loss of her
homestead exemption and thus, her home equity and her home. Further,
if Debtor plans to move from Old State, and Old State has a homestead
exemption that is, on its face, less favorable than the homestead
exemption of New State, Debtor may still prefer to file bankruptcy in
Old State prior to the move. This is because Debtor will be denied
eligibility for her homestead exemption in New State for two years and
because Debtor will be denied her homestead exemption in Old State
for lack of residence once she moves. Assuming the less favorable
homestead exemption of Old State is still better than the federal
homestead exemption (as in the majority of jurisdictions), Debtor will
prefer the certainty of the Old State homestead exemption to the risk of
either losing her homestead exemption, or being compelled to “elect”
the federal homestead exemption under the savings clause. The result is
that Debtor will file preemptively in Old State before she moves.
This dilemma may cause Debtor to file preemptively because she
knows her exemption will be lost or limited to the amount of the federal
homestead exemption if she is forced to file during the two-year lookback period after moving to the new domiciliary state. This is because
Debtor will not have met the requisite two-year look-back period, and
thus she will not be eligible for the homestead exemption in the former
domiciliary state at the time of filing because of the residency
requirement for exemption eligibility.
If look-back periods alone are an effective tool to combat abuse, why
must the periods vary so much in length? One explanation might be
that it is usually more difficult for a debtor to relocate than to simply
convert assets in attempting to gain financial advantage,214 which may
explain the disparities in the look-back periods themselves. However, it
does not explain why the formula Congress selected to control the abuse
of conversion of non-exempt assets to exempt assets under § 522(o) was
abandoned as a tool in combating abuse through relocation to acquire
exemption eligibility. There is a better approach.
E. A Plan to Protect the “O-Zone”
In contrast to the abuse prevention mechanisms of § 522(b)(3)(A), §
522(o) creates a zone of protection, or “o-zone,” around creditors. This
666715.htm (stating that there is a correlation between medical costs and personal bankruptcy).
214. This assumes that in relative terms, the debtor’s assets are liquid and can be disposed of,
while relocation is burdensome or impossible.
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provision is designed to prevent a debtor’s conversion of non-exempt
assets to exempt assets.215 The provision permits the bankruptcy trustee
and creditors to reduce the debtor’s homestead exemption to the extent
that the assets disposed of would not have been exempt at the time of
filing had the debtor held those assets at filing.216 This strategy
deprives the debtor of any advantage from the conversion and makes an
equivalent amount of home equity available to satisfy creditors’ claims
to compensate for the conversion.
Is there a way to protect the interests of creditors while at the same
time providing fair treatment to the honest debtor, who moves to find or
maintain employment, act as caregiver, seek medical treatment, or
retire? For the debtor who relocates with no ulterior motive or intention
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, there should be no arbitrary
financial penalty based solely on relocation to a new state. By the same
token, there should be no windfall to creditors merely because of the
honest debtor’s relocation. So how do we devise a formula for
determining whether a particular debtor’s relocation is bankruptcy
abuse?
Congress agrees that it is possible to examine the debtor’s history for
the ten-year period preceding the filing and ascertain whether
nonexempt assets have been converted to exempt assets with the
intention to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.217
This same
determination could be made regarding whether a debtor relocated to
exempt assets with the intention to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
A simple inquiry would reveal property held at the time of relocation
that would not have been exempt in the immediate former domiciliary
state (not necessarily the look-back state) and any intermediate former
domiciliary states at the time of filing, had it been held by the debtor.
As under the provision on conversion, this inquiry would be made
concerning whether the relocation was with the intent to hinder, delay,
or defraud creditors. This rule serves to address abuse no matter when
the relocation takes place within the ten-year look-back period prior to
filing.218

215. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) (2006).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. The Code provisions at 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(1), 727(a)(2), and 522(l) each provide a
means of addressing abuse, though none include a look-back period of ten years.
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IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REFORM
A. The Realities of Relocation
High-profile cases in the media about CEOs and celebrities who
abuse the bankruptcy system generated the political pressure to close
the mansion loophole.219 However, most relocation occurs for reasons
other than avoiding creditors. The relocation to another state may be
related to employment, family, or other reasons.220 Legislative action is
necessary to protect both innocent debtors and creditors.
Millions of people move to a new state each year, and of the top ten
states for inflow migration, nine are in the top ten for outflow
migration.221 The common denominator is that these states are
populous and attractive for employment and retirement.222 Among
those states are Texas and Florida, which both offer an unlimited
homestead exemption to their residents but not to nonresidents.223 This
means that the unlimited homestead exemption of a relocating
homeowner from these states could be put at risk if the debtor files
bankruptcy within two years of the relocation. As discussed above, the
amount of home equity that is lost may vary.224 For a debtor whose
home equity is in excess of $21,625, the loss in value of the debtor’s
homestead exemption would be the remaining balance of the debtor’s
home equity.

219. The BAPCPA reforms followed the corporate scandals of Enron and other large
corporations, coupled with the bankruptcy filings of principal players, in which large amounts of
money were sheltered from creditors’ claims through the unlimited homestead exemptions
available in Florida and Texas. For example, the $4.7 million home of former CEO Jeffrey
Skilling and the $950,000 residence of ex-top accountant Richard Causey were among many
forfeiture actions pending against defendants in Enron-related criminal cases. Kristen Hays,
Prosecutors Seeking Lavish Homes of Former Enron Executives, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 28,
2004, available at http://jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/022804/bus_14943456.shtml.
220. More People Willing to Relocate for New Jobs; Many Moving to Texas, DALL. BUS. J.
(July 28, 2009), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2009/07/27/daily18.html. According
to employment research firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas, rising unemployment rates coincide
with relocation rates among workers who are willing to move across the United States for a new
job. Id. In the second quarter of 2009, the firm’s data showed that an astonishing 18.2% of job
seekers secured employment by moving for their new position. Id. The Internet is making it
easier for job seekers to find work out of the regions they reside in, and the overwhelming desire
to get back to work appears to be outweighing the perceived risks of relocation. Id.
221. Pew Social Trends Staff, Map: U.S. Migration Flows, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Dec. 17,
2008), http://pewsocialtrends.org/2008/12/17/u-s-migration-flows/ (listing the top ten inflow
migration states as California, Texas, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Arizona, North Carolina,
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York with Ohio replacing Arizona on the list of the top ten
outflow migration states).
222. Id.
223. BROWN ET AL., supra note 25, at app. C.
224. See supra Part II.A.2.
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The migration statistics from these two states provide an idea of the
number of people who may be asked to choose between a new job in
another state that puts their homestead exemption at risk and an
unwanted bankruptcy to guard the homestead exemption they have. In
outflow migration, Florida ranks second and Texas ranks fourth.225 In
inflow migration, Florida ranks first, and Texas ranks second.226
Between 2005 and 2007, hundreds of thousands of people migrated by
and between these two states alone.227 The total outflow migration for
the two states during that period was over one million.228 In other
words, even on a state-to-state basis, large numbers of people may be
affected.
B. Crafting an Amendment to the Code
Neither the two-month look-back period under § 522(b)(3)(A) nor the
dollar cap under § 522(p) consider the debtor-creditor relationship to
determine whether the debtor gains or the creditor suffers from the
relocation.229 The look-back period for eligibility rewards or punishes
the debtor based on an arbitrary point in the debtor’s domiciliary history
and the debtor’s domiciliary eligibility in the look-back state at the time
of filing.230 The homestead equity cap unfairly punishes a debtor solely
for relocating to a new jurisdiction.
An amendment addressing the weaknesses of the look-back provision
under current law at § 522(b)(3)(A) and the federal dollar cap at §
522(p) could be accomplished in a number of ways: (1) by adapting the
language of § 522(o) to prevent the shielding of nonexempt assets to
hinder, delay or defraud creditors through relocation, (2) by restoring
the original § 522(b)(3)(A) look-back period language to coincide with
the domiciliary requirement for venue as it existed for over twenty-five
years, (3) by repealing the federal dollar cap on state homestead
exemptions as inequitable, and (4) by repealing the savings clause as
unnecessary.
1. A Formula for Fairness
The language in § 522(o) takes into account the value of any
nonexempt property disposed of by the debtor and converted to exempt

225. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 221.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Unlike other provisions of the Code, such as 11 U.S.C. § 522(o) (2006) and § 548, no
proof of intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors is required in § 522(b)(3)(A) or § 522(p).
230. 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(3)(A), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(17), 124 Stat. 3557, 3559.
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property and offsets the value against the debtor’s homestead
exemption.231 This makes what would otherwise be the debtor’s
interest in exempt property claimed as a residence, homestead, or burial
plot available to the trustee for distribution to creditors.232 The formula
for ascertaining the amount of any necessary reduction is simple and
straightforward. The value of the debtor’s interest that is protected
under the homestead exemption is reduced to the extent that such value
is attributable to any property that the debtor disposed of during the ten
years prior to filing with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors,
if the property disposed of would not have been exempt at the time of
filing, had it been held by the debtor.
In other words, to the extent that the debtor has converted nonexempt
assets to exempt assets within ten years of filing in order to avoid
creditors, the value of the debtor’s interest that is protected under the
homestead exemption is reduced precisely and proportionately to
restore an equivalent asset value to the debtor’s estate for the benefit of
creditors. For example, suppose a debtor with a large amount of
nonexempt cash uses the cash to pay down the mortgage on a home
protected by an unlimited homestead exemption. Further, suppose that
the debtor files bankruptcy within ten years of the disposition of the
cash. In that event, the total dollar amount of the funds disposed of by
the debtor to reduce the mortgage debt would be deducted from her
homestead exemption.
In the context of the proposed reform, the amended language would
adopt the wording from § 522(o) to create a similar formula. For
example, the amendment could provide that
the value of the debtor’s interest in exempt property will be reduced to
the extent that such value is attributable to any portion of any property
231. 11 U.S.C. § 522(o).
232. While this phraseology is not used in § 522(o), the import of the provision generally is to
have this effect. The phrase used in § 522(o) is
value of an interest in . . . real or personal property used as a residence by the debtor or
a dependent, a cooperative used as a residence by the debtor or a dependent, a burial
plot for the debtor or a dependent, or a homestead claimed by the debtor or a
dependent.
11 U.S.C. § 522(o). All of these interests qualify for the federal homestead exemption and some
qualify for exemption under state law. The reality is that unless the debtor is able to claim one or
more of these properties as exempt, the “value” of the debtor’s interest would be subject to
creditors’ claims. If that were the case, it would not be possible to “reduce” the debtor’s interest
because the creditors’ claims would consume the debtor’s interest subject to the satisfaction of all
claims or exhaustion of the value of the interest, whichever comes first. For that reason, the only
practical value of the provision to creditors is to reduce the value of the debtor’s interest in
property of this type that is exempt. Only then can the value of the debtor’s interest in the
property be used so that creditors recoup the value lost in the original transfer of assets. To the
extent any of the property interests listed may be exempted other than as homestead property, the
result remains the same.
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owned by the debtor at the time of relocation that would not have been
exempt, during the three-year period preceding the filing in the
debtor’s former domiciliary states, if relocation was done with the
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.

Softening the ten-year look-back period to a three-year look-back
period is the only significant change. There are good reasons to provide
for a ten-year look-back period in § 522(o). There are equally good
reasons to limit the look-back period to three years with regard to an
amendment encompassing relocation.
One reason to limit the look-back period is that it is more difficult to
relocate than to convert nonexempt assets to exempt assets through a
change in form. In other words, a debtor may effect a change in the
form of assets over the course of ten years without the difficulty of
relocating. For example, over a ten-year period a debtor might
gradually begin the transfer of cash into a number of types of exempt
property, from jewelry to retirement funds, without much fanfare or
hardship.
In contrast, relocating is not easily accomplished and requires more
planning and foresight when it involves a homeowner. It is more taxing
on the debtor and the debtor’s dependents. It is more visible, and thus,
less concealable. A move is likely to be more costly than transfers of
personal property. In short, as a means of acquiring and enhancing
homestead exemption value, relocation is cumbersome and ineffective.
A second reason to limit the look-back period is that the evidentiary
trail simply becomes too long. Statutes of limitation are common
throughout the law. Except for murder, almost every cause of action
has a statute that limits the timeframe within which an action must be
brought. The underlying principle that supports the rationale for these
statutes is that beyond a certain point in time, the parties will be unable
to discover and produce the evidence relevant to the court’s inquiry.
That is no less true in this context. As a practical matter, the more
distant the conduct, the more difficult it becomes to prove or disprove
what occurred. As the look-back period extends back in time, it
becomes increasingly likely that even an honest debtor may not be able
to secure the evidence needed to rebut allegations regarding intent,
motive, and circumstances. The ready availability of evidence to all
interested parties is essential not only to the search for the truth but also
to the public perception of the fairness of the judicial process.
Finally, a third reason is that the exemption laws of a particular state
may change over time. The longer the look-back period, the more
likely the applicable exemption law may vary between states and within
a state. This means that the exempt nature or status of property could
change over time, independent of any action by the debtor.
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2. Moving Forward Without Looking Back
This statutory solution minimizes the need for look-back periods. It
dispenses with the need for the savings clause because the debtor’s
eligibility or ineligibility for exemptions in the current domiciliary state
will no longer necessarily determine the value of those exemptions.
This is because even if the debtor is otherwise eligible for a particular
homestead exemption, the value of that exemption will vary according
to whether the debtor converted nonexempt assets to exempt assets. In
other words, if assets are converted from nonexempt status to exempt
status, whether through a change in the form of the assets or through
relocation, the value of the homestead exemption is reduced
accordingly. Thus, there is no net financial gain to the debtor, and no
net financial loss to the creditors.
A key consideration should be whether the debtor sought to hinder,
delay, or defraud creditors by relocating to acquire exemption
eligibility. If the debtor did not profit from the move at creditors’
expense, then a presumption should arise that the move was not to
hinder, delay, or defraud them. Thus, the value of the homestead
exemption will be controlled by an inquiry into the circumstances
surrounding the relocation. The total value will be unaffected if the
assets at the time of the relocation would have been exempt in the
debtor’s immediate former domiciliary state and intermediate former
domiciliary states at the time of the filing. In other words, if every state
the debtor has lived in for the past ten years has a homestead exemption
sufficiently large to protect the debtor’s home equity, the debtor should
not lose her homestead exemption merely because she moves to another
state.
Conversely, to the extent that a portion of the assets of the debtor
would not have been exempt under the laws of the debtor’s former
domiciliary states at the time of filing, the value of the debtor’s
exemptions should be reduced if the relocation was made with the intent
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Thus, creditors are protected
when relocation is tantamount to the conversion of nonexempt assets to
exempt assets. When relocation alone serves neither to add nor subtract
value regarding the debtor’s exemptions, the wisdom and utility of
identifying a random jurisdiction in the domiciliary history of the debtor
has no value. Whether the exemption laws of the debtor’s current
domiciliary state or the look-back state add or subtract value to the
debtor’s interest only has relevance in the context of a particular
debtor’s eligibility to claim them.
Under these circumstances, the unscrupulous debtor will be
prevented from gaining financial advantage through relocation to
acquire exemption eligibility when the intent is to hinder, delay, or
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defraud creditors. At the same time, the honest debtor, moving for
motives unrelated to avoiding creditors’ claims and seeking
employment to better pay her bills, will not unfairly lose her home
equity because she neglected to consult bankruptcy counsel and file
bankruptcy prior to moving.
While this proposal for statutory reform suggests change, it is not
unfamiliar change. Restoration of the original domiciliary period for
exemption eligibility to coincide with the venue requirement restores an
appropriate and reasonable period that served the bankruptcy system
well for over a quarter of a century.233 Nor does this proposal change
the existing—and necessary—inquiry to identify the current domiciliary
state and former domiciliary states. It does bring fundamental fairness
to the exemption process, however. The proposed amendment would
look to the financial implications for the interested parties rather than
the mere fact of relocation. It would consider whether the debtor’s
interstate relocation increased the value of exemptions and, if so,
whether the relocation was intended to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors.
3. Eliminating the Dollar Cap that Contributes to Home Loss
The proposed statutory solution affects only the homestead
exemption, leaving the dollar caps on all other categories of state and
federal exemptions in place. The present dollar cap on homestead
equity for a relocating debtor is problematic in a highly mobile society
in which relocation may be essential to finding or continuing
employment and in which median home prices vary so much by region.
The job-hunting homeowner’s dilemma comes into sharper focus when
one considers that homestead equity remains a family’s principal asset
and primary protection against unexpected expenses or loss of
income.234
Adapting the language of § 522(o) would result in an amended statute
that makes more sense. A new provision should provide that the value
of the debtor’s interest in exempt homestead property will be reduced
by the amount attributable to any portion of the debtor’s property owned
at the time of relocation to the debtor’s current domicile that would not
have been exempt prior to relocation during the three-year period
preceding the date of filing, if the relocation was with the intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.

233. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1) (stating the requirements for venue in district courts). This would
be tantamount to a return to prior law.
234. E.g., Justin Lahart & Kelly Evans, Trapped in the Middle, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 19, 2008,
at A1.
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The unfairness and inequity of the federal dollar cap on the state
homestead exemption is striking when it is understood that the
unlimited state homestead exemption still exists in several states and
can be utilized by any homeowner domiciled there for over three years
and four months.235 The true victim of the dollar cap in § 522(p) is the
debtor relocating from that same state for a job. She is the debtor who,
while once under the protection of that same unlimited homestead
exemption, stands to lose it by taking the job out of state. She is the one
who, having left her domicile, cannot turn back and recover it. She is
the one who, though she works and domiciles in her new state for more
than three years and qualifies for its unlimited homestead exemption,
may not receive it. She may not receive it because as she struggles
toward solvency, she faces the prospect of landing in bankruptcy in less
than three years and four months. That magical time period, likely
unknown to her, could mean the difference in her ability to keep her
home. It may be the difference in her inability to save her home and the
ability of her counterpart who relocates within the same state to keep
hers.
This scenario should not occur merely because she moves from a
state with an unlimited homestead exemption to a state with a limited
homestead exemption. What did she do that was so egregious that her
home equity should be placed at risk? In all probability, it is a risk she
assumed without any knowledge or warning. Is the loss of her home
equity the price she must pay for moving to another state and failing to
become solvent prior to the passage of three years and four months? If
so, this seems unnecessarily random and disproportionately punitive. It
is difficult to imagine that anyone involved in the passage of the current
law could have possibly intended such a result.
4. Rescuing Debtors from the Savings Clause
Repeal of the savings clause would eliminate the need to determine
the effect of the domiciliary requirement on the debtor’s eligibility to
claim exemptions in the look-back state. If the savings clause were
repealed, the inquiry would focus on whether the debtor’s relocation
increased the value of exempt property, and whether the debtor intended
to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by relocating.
As discussed above, courts cannot agree on the meaning of the
savings clause. The differing interpretations of the operative passage
“ineligible for any” have resulted in radically different outcomes.236 In

235. See supra note 96 (noting that Texas, Kansas, Iowa, Florida, Arkansas, South Dakota,
Oklahoma, Guam, and the District of Columbia have homestead exemptions).
236. See supra Part II.B.
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some cases, the debtor has not received a full complement of either the
federal exemptions or the state exemptions. In other words, the debtor
was awarded only one exemption from the look-back state, and not a
complete set of exemptions. Because no court of appeals has had the
opportunity to clarify the law, debtors and counsel are left to speculate
on what may happen when the savings clause is implicated. As a result,
the savings clause as presently construed has sufficient ambiguity to
create a chilling effect on its use and inhibit those who might otherwise
seek and trust its protection.
A judicial resolution could solve the preemption issue and define the
word “any” for purposes of the savings clause. However, courts cannot
alter the fundamental inequity inherent in forcing relocating debtors to
risk their homestead exemption and home equity in a choice between
reemployment across state lines and preemptive bankruptcy. Ideally,
the law should encourage migration to gain or maintain employment
and discourage the need for preemptive filing to preserve home equity
by taking away the arbitrary penalty for interstate relocation when there
is no intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Only a statutory
amendment can do that.
To be fair, there are other statutory options for reform. Current law
could be reformed to provide for identification of the look-back state
and to make the state exemptions of the look-back state available to the
debtor through preemption, without regard to state domiciliary
requirements. Essentially, this would be achieved by statutory
amendment, the result espoused by Professor Bartell and adopted in the
reasoning of In re Camp.237 This reform would be simple and
straightforward but, by itself, would not rectify these problems. The
problem of tying the debtor’s exemption eligibility to a random point in
her domiciliary history would remain. There would still be the
fundamental insensitivity to the financial impact of the debtor’s
relocation on the debtor, her dependents, her creditors, and our society.
This avenue has the potential for clarity at the expense of fundamental
fairness and justice. It would offer up the debtor’s home equity in the
interest of simplicity.
Another option would be to amend the law so that a debtor who is
ineligible for the full complement of exemptions in the look-back state
would be entitled to claim the federal exemptions. This idea could
operate in much the same way the savings clause was intended to

237. 396 B.R. 194, 202–03 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2008), rev’d, 631 F.3d 757 (5th Cir. 2011)
(holding that the Florida residency restriction was pre-empted by the choice of law provision in §
522(b)(3)(A), and that Florida exemption laws applied to the debtor and precluded the
nonresident debtor from choosing exemptions under the savings clause).
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function. A debtor who is ineligible for any portion of the state law
exemptions of either the current domicile or the look-back state would
be granted the federal exemptions rather than being denied any
exemptions. The amendment would be implemented through federal
preemption as in our first option; however, the preemption of state law
would allow the debtor the federal exemptions rather than the
exemptions of the look-back state.
This second alternative also offers clarity and simplicity. But, as
with the first alternative, it fails to address the critical issues. As
explained above, under either alternative, the job-seeking, relocating
debtor could still put her homestead exemption at risk.238 This is
because she has acquired the homestead exemption in her current
domicile. She is protected and remains protected unless and until she
abandons her domicile. At that point, having abandoned her domicile,
she is put at risk if she files bankruptcy because under either alternative
she may not receive a homestead exemption equivalent to what she
originally had.
Why would a debtor purposely abandon a homestead exemption in an
amount sufficient to cover her equity, and thus put her home equity at
risk? The likely answer is that she would only do so because she is
struggling to avoid bankruptcy. Otherwise, she would utilize the
protection of the homestead exemption in her current domicile prior to
the move by filing bankruptcy first and then moving to accept the new
job out of state.239
Thus, the only alternative that deals with the fundamental inequity of
denying a relocating debtor access to the value of a homestead
exemption previously acquired is one that considers her plight and looks
at the circumstances. It is an alternative that offers her hope that she
and her dependents may be protected. It offers a way out of her
dilemma.
Equally important, creditors are more likely to receive fair treatment
under this alternative. The idea that creditors are presumptively
238. See supra Part II.A.
239. Under the venue provisions, the debtor may be able to move to the new state to accept
employment and later file a voluntary petition in her former domicile if she does so before the
window of opportunity expires. However, her homestead property would be determined as of the
date of filing. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006), amended by Bankruptcy Technical Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-327, § 2(a)(22), 124 Stat. 3557, 3560. Thus, if she files in the former
domicile after moving, she risks losing the homestead exemption because, by definition, she will
have moved from the former domicile. And, though she retains ownership, she will likely have
abandoned her homestead because the domiciliary requirements of physical possession and
domiciliary intent will be absent. See 2 BANKRUPTCY DESK GUIDE §§ 13:58, 13:60, 13:61
(2011) (explaining that typical homestead requirements under various state constitutions require
debtors to both own an interest in the property and use it as a residence).

202

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 43

“hindered” merely because a debtor moves to a state with a generous
homestead exemption is a red herring. That is both because creditors
may benefit from the debtor’s relocation and because the debtor may
have had an equally generous homestead prior to the move. The only
homestead exemption that matters to the debtor is the one for which she
is eligible. Otherwise, the homestead cannot be utilized to protect her
home equity. To prevent the acquisition of a more generous homestead
exemption by some debtors and call it “reform,” while disregarding the
loss of homestead protection for struggling American homeowners, is
unfair and unnecessary.
5. An Appeal for Mercy and Understanding
The urgency of statutory reform to job-seeking homeowners cannot
be overstated. It is a risk that affects an enormous number of
Americans—and the number is growing. The national unemployment
rate for 2009 was 9.3%. The unemployment rate for 2010 increased to
9.6% and represents 14,825,000 unemployed people seeking work.240
These statistics take on added significance when coupled with studies
related to why people move. A job or business opportunity is the most
popular reason why individuals move to a new community.241 In
simple terms, with nearly 15 million people out of work, it makes sense
that most of those who are unemployed would not hesitate to move to
accept a job in a new state. The insolvent debtor would likely see it as
the right thing to do and the best course of action, even if it means
separation from family and friends. Most Americans would consider
the move a wise choice.
That is because accepting a new job to escape unemployment
normally would be the key to preserving home ownership. That would
be considered a wise choice because a home has always been part of the
American dream, just as a job has always been part of the American
work ethic. For many Americans, a home and a job have always gone
hand-in-hand. Now, for the first time, the unemployed homeowner may
be forced to accept a Hobson’s choice: choosing between accepting
employment that may put her home at risk and filing a bankruptcy she
thought new employment would help her avoid.242

240. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL
AVERAGES—EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE CIVILIAN NON-INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION, 1940
TO DATE (2009), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aat1.txt.
241. A Pew study shows that job and business opportunities are the primary reason for a move
by a plurality of 44%. Cohn & Morin, supra note 8, at 2.
242. “Hobson’s choice” is an apparently free choice when there is no real alternative or the
necessity of choosing one of two equally objectionable choices. MERRIAM-WEBSTER
DICTIONARY 372 (2011).
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V. CONCLUSION
A statutory change is needed to provide clarity, promote fairness to
all parties, and minimize the possibility of conflicting decisions.
Implicit in Congress’ decision to combat fraud are three basic
assumptions: (1) there is a period of time beyond which it is improbable
that a debtor will relocate to a new jurisdiction to hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors; (2) there should be a limit on the value of exempt
homestead property a relocating debtor may shield from creditors’
claims through relocation; (3) the imposition of statutory controls based
on the first two assumptions will prevent debtors from “gaming the
system” to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors.
Present law fails to accomplish the goals of preventing abuse and
protecting creditors. Instead, it exacerbates the problem through its
arbitrary imposition of a look-back period, which disregards the
financial impact on the parties. Fairness to all parties can be restored
and gaming can be minimized through an amendment that: (1) restores
the domiciliary period required for exemption eligibility to coincide
with the provisions on venue;243 (2) adopts a formula to prevent
conversion of non-exempt assets to exempt assets by interstate
relocation by examining the debtor’s intent and the impact of the
relocation on the relative financial positions of interested parties; (3)
repeals the dollar cap on the state homestead exemption of a relocating
debtor to prevent an unwarranted loss of her home equity based solely
on the debtor’s relocation to a new state; and (4) repeals the existing
savings clause as unnecessary once clarity is restored to the process of
exemption eligibility analysis.
The proposed amendment deals with relocation gaming in a
straightforward and meaningful manner. Under the proposed reform, a
bankruptcy trustee bears a burden of proof similar to when it is alleged
that nonexempt property has been converted to exempt property through
a change in the form of the asset. The trustee would need to prove that
the debtor (1) increased the value of her exemption at the expense of
creditors through relocation from a former domicile within three years
of filing, and (2) intended by relocating to hinder, delay, or defraud
creditors. Once this is proven, the court will be able to reduce the value
of the exemptions precisely and proportionately. Together, these
modest changes will eliminate much of the confusion that exists under
present law and simplify the resolution of this issue for debtors,
creditors, trustees, counsel, and the courts.

243. 28 U.S.C. § 1408(1).

